Files
Password-Manager/delphi-backend/Source/PM.Database.pas
T
Zaki 9f6636defc feat(auth): per-account brute-force lockout with exponential backoff
Existing protection was per-IP only (login_attempts table). On a loopback
deployment everyone hits 127.0.0.1, so the per-IP counter is mostly
ornamental — the real attacker is on the same machine. Adds a second
defense layer that tracks failures per username with an exponential
backoff schedule.

Schema:
  account_lockouts (username TEXT PK, failed_count INT,
                    locked_until DATETIME, last_attempt_at, last_attempt_ip)

Backoff after threshold (4+ failures):
  1, 2, 3 failures → no lockout (grace window for typos)
  4th             → 60 s
  5th             → 5 min
  6th             → 15 min
  7th             → 1 h
  8th             → 6 h
  9th and beyond  → 24 h (capped)

Counter resets to 0 on successful login or reauth. Old non-locked rows
older than 30 days are pruned by CleanupExpired alongside the existing
sessions / audit_log / login_attempts cleanups.

Wiring:
 - HandleLogin / HandleReauth both check RejectIfAccountLocked() before
   touching the users table. Lockout responses are 429 with JSON body
   { error, retry_after } and a Retry-After header.
 - Failed attempts are recorded against the username even when the user
   doesn't exist, preventing account enumeration via differential
   "is this account locked?" probes.
 - PBKDF2 hash comparison was already constant-time (ConstantTimeEquals);
   no change there.

Client (js/app.js):
 - api() now preserves response status + body on Error so callers can
   distinguish 429-lockout from other errors.
 - New showLockoutCountdown(seconds) renders a live "Account locked —
   try again in Xm Ys" message in #authHint, disables #loginBtn until
   the countdown reaches 0, then re-enables it.
 - doLogin / doUnlock both branch on err.status === 429 + retry_after
   to call showLockoutCountdown instead of a generic error toast.

Known limitation: an attacker can DoS-lock arbitrary usernames by
spamming /login with that name. This is intentional — the alternative
(per-(username,IP) tracking) would let attackers enumerate accounts.
DoS-lock is acceptable; auth bypass is not.
2026-05-23 00:14:44 +01:00

252 lines
8.3 KiB
ObjectPascal

unit PM.Database;
{
SQLite connection (FireDAC) toward the shared vault.db file.
CreateSchema mirrors api.php (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS + ALTER migrations).
Per-thread connection is NOT implemented yet — single connection guarded by
TMonitor. Indy's TIdHTTPServer is thread-per-connection, so we serialize DB
access for safety until we move to a connection pool.
}
interface
uses
System.SysUtils, System.Classes, System.IOUtils, System.SyncObjs,
FireDAC.Comp.Client, FireDAC.Stan.Def, FireDAC.Stan.Async,
FireDAC.Phys.SQLite, FireDAC.DApt, FireDAC.Stan.Param,
FireDAC.FMXUI.Wait, FireDAC.Stan.Intf, FireDAC.UI.Intf,
Data.DB;
type
TPMDatabase = class
private
FConn: TFDConnection;
FLock: TCriticalSection;
FDBPath: string;
function ColumnExists(const ATable, AColumn: string): Boolean;
procedure AddColumnIfMissing(const ATable, AColumn, ADef: string);
procedure CreateSchema;
procedure ApplyMigrations;
procedure CleanupExpired;
public
constructor Create(const ADBPath: string);
destructor Destroy; override;
procedure Lock;
procedure Unlock;
property Connection: TFDConnection read FConn;
property DBPath: string read FDBPath;
end;
var
DB: TPMDatabase;
procedure InitDatabase(const ADBPath: string);
procedure DoneDatabase;
implementation
constructor TPMDatabase.Create(const ADBPath: string);
begin
inherited Create;
FDBPath := ADBPath;
FLock := TCriticalSection.Create;
FConn := TFDConnection.Create(nil);
FConn.DriverName := 'SQLite';
FConn.Params.Values['Database'] := FDBPath;
FConn.Params.Values['LockingMode'] := 'Normal';
FConn.Params.Values['Synchronous'] := 'Normal';
FConn.Params.Values['BusyTimeout'] := '5000';
FConn.Params.Values['JournalMode'] := 'WAL';
FConn.Open;
CreateSchema;
ApplyMigrations;
CleanupExpired;
end;
destructor TPMDatabase.Destroy;
begin
FConn.Free;
FLock.Free;
inherited;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.Lock;
begin
FLock.Enter;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.Unlock;
begin
FLock.Leave;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.CreateSchema;
begin
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' username TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,' +
' password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' salt TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' hash_algo TEXT DEFAULT ''pbkdf2''' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS folders (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' name TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,' +
' UNIQUE(user_id, name)' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vault_entries (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' site TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' username TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' encrypted_password TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' iv TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' encryption_method TEXT DEFAULT ''server'',' +
' folder TEXT DEFAULT ''All'',' +
' deleted INTEGER DEFAULT 0,' +
' deleted_at DATETIME,' +
' favorite INTEGER DEFAULT 0,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' updated_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' token_hash TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,' +
' csrf_token TEXT,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' expires_at DATETIME NOT NULL,' +
' FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS login_attempts (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' ip TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' attempted_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
// Per-username lockout state, complementing the per-IP login_attempts
// counter. On a loopback-only deployment the per-IP counter is mostly
// useless (everyone hits 127.0.0.1), so the per-username counter is the
// real defense against brute-force.
// - failed_count: total failures since the last successful auth
// - locked_until: timestamp the account becomes available again (NULL = not locked)
// - last_attempt_at / _ip: forensic info for the audit log
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS account_lockouts (' +
' username TEXT PRIMARY KEY,' +
' failed_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,' +
' locked_until DATETIME,' +
' last_attempt_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' last_attempt_ip TEXT' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER,' +
' action TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' ip TEXT,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS passkey_challenges (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER,' +
' challenge BLOB NOT NULL,' +
' type TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS passkey_credentials (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' credential_id BLOB NOT NULL UNIQUE,' +
' public_key BLOB NOT NULL,' +
' counter INTEGER DEFAULT 0,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE' +
')');
end;
function TPMDatabase.ColumnExists(const ATable, AColumn: string): Boolean;
var
LQ: TFDQuery;
begin
Result := False;
LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
try
LQ.Connection := FConn;
// PRAGMA table_info returns one row per column with name in column 'name'
LQ.SQL.Text := 'PRAGMA table_info(' + ATable + ')';
LQ.Open;
while not LQ.Eof do
begin
if SameText(LQ.FieldByName('name').AsString, AColumn) then
Exit(True);
LQ.Next;
end;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.AddColumnIfMissing(const ATable, AColumn, ADef: string);
begin
if not ColumnExists(ATable, AColumn) then
FConn.ExecSQL('ALTER TABLE ' + ATable + ' ADD COLUMN ' + AColumn + ' ' + ADef);
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.ApplyMigrations;
begin
// Idempotent: only ALTER when the column is actually missing — no exception
// bubbling up to the debugger like api.php's try/catch did.
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'encryption_method', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''server''');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'folder', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''All''');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'deleted', 'INTEGER DEFAULT 0');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'deleted_at', 'DATETIME');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'favorite', 'INTEGER DEFAULT 0');
// UI V2: tags stored as comma-separated TEXT (e.g. "work,important,2fa").
// Simple format, search via LIKE %tag%. Frontend handles parsing/joining.
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'tags', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''''');
AddColumnIfMissing('users', 'hash_algo', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''pbkdf2''');
AddColumnIfMissing('sessions', 'csrf_token', 'TEXT');
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.CleanupExpired;
begin
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < datetime(''now'')');
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM login_attempts WHERE attempted_at < datetime(''now'', ''-15 minutes'')');
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE created_at < datetime(''now'', ''-30 days'')');
// Account lockout entries: prune rows that are no longer locked AND haven't
// been touched in 30 days (the user clearly isn't being attacked anymore).
// Active lockouts and recent attempts are preserved.
FConn.ExecSQL(
'DELETE FROM account_lockouts ' +
'WHERE (locked_until IS NULL OR locked_until < datetime(''now'')) ' +
'AND last_attempt_at < datetime(''now'', ''-30 days'')');
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM passkey_challenges WHERE created_at < datetime(''now'', ''-10 minutes'')');
end;
procedure InitDatabase(const ADBPath: string);
begin
if DB = nil then
DB := TPMDatabase.Create(ADBPath);
end;
procedure DoneDatabase;
begin
FreeAndNil(DB);
end;
initialization
finalization
DoneDatabase;
end.