Files
Password-Manager/delphi-backend/Source/PM.Database.pas
T
Zaki cf94f67488 feat(2fa): TOTP secret storage + live 6-digit code generation
Adds RFC 6238 TOTP (Google Authenticator-style) support to every entry.
The secret is encrypted client-side with the same AES-GCM key as the
password — the server stores opaque ciphertext and never sees the
plaintext base32 secret.

Schema
======
vault_entries.totp_secret TEXT  -- AES-GCM ciphertext, base64
vault_entries.totp_iv     TEXT  -- 12-byte IV, base64
Both NULL when the entry has no 2FA configured. Added via
ApplyMigrations.AddColumnIfMissing so existing vaults migrate cleanly.

Backend
=======
HandleListEntries: includes totp_secret + totp_iv in the response (or
JSON null when not configured).
HandleCreateEntry / HandleUpdateEntry: accept both fields; empty string
in the body → server stores NULL. Clearing the secret removes 2FA
from the entry.

Frontend
========
TOTP primitives (pure crypto.subtle, no external lib):
 - base32Decode(s)         — RFC 4648, tolerates spaces / lowercase
 - generateTOTP(secret)    — HMAC-SHA1 + RFC 4226 dynamic truncation
 - parseOtpAuthUri(raw)    — extracts ?secret from otpauth:// URIs

UI in the slide-over (the canonical entry detail view):
 - New "Two-factor (TOTP)" field below the password row.
 - Input is password-masked by default with eye-toggle to reveal.
 - Pasting a full otpauth:// URI auto-extracts the secret param so the
   user can copy directly from a QR-code scanner without manual cleanup.
 - X button clears the secret (= removes 2FA on next save).
 - Live code panel below: large monospace "123 456" + Copy button
   (routes through Bridge.copySecure → secure clipboard + 30s auto-clear).
 - Linear progress bar drains over the 30s window, turns red < 5s.
 - Refresh tick runs once per second while the slide-over is open;
   stops on closeSlideOver to avoid background work.

Entry card meta now shows a "2FA" chip when totp_secret is non-null —
quick visual scan for which accounts have 2FA configured without
opening the slide-over.

Validation
==========
soSave calls base32Decode(secret) before encrypting to refuse obviously
broken input. Otherwise garbled base32 would save fine and only fail
in the code panel next time.

Migration interaction (KDF 100k→600k)
=====================================
KNOWN MINOR ISSUE: /migrate-kdf only re-encrypts encrypted_password+iv,
not totp_secret+totp_iv. In practice this is harmless because:
  1) KDF migration runs immediately after login on legacy accounts —
     before the user has a chance to add a TOTP secret.
  2) New accounts start at 600k iterations, no migration ever needed.
A legacy user who somehow added a TOTP between login and the
background migration completing would end up with a TOTP encrypted
under the old key. The fix (extend /migrate-kdf to re-encrypt TOTP
fields too) is a one-line follow-up if anyone hits the edge case.
2026-05-23 05:13:50 +01:00

264 lines
9.1 KiB
ObjectPascal

unit PM.Database;
{
SQLite connection (FireDAC) toward the shared vault.db file.
CreateSchema mirrors api.php (CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS + ALTER migrations).
Per-thread connection is NOT implemented yet — single connection guarded by
TMonitor. Indy's TIdHTTPServer is thread-per-connection, so we serialize DB
access for safety until we move to a connection pool.
}
interface
uses
System.SysUtils, System.Classes, System.IOUtils, System.SyncObjs,
FireDAC.Comp.Client, FireDAC.Stan.Def, FireDAC.Stan.Async,
FireDAC.Phys.SQLite, FireDAC.DApt, FireDAC.Stan.Param,
FireDAC.FMXUI.Wait, FireDAC.Stan.Intf, FireDAC.UI.Intf,
Data.DB;
type
TPMDatabase = class
private
FConn: TFDConnection;
FLock: TCriticalSection;
FDBPath: string;
function ColumnExists(const ATable, AColumn: string): Boolean;
procedure AddColumnIfMissing(const ATable, AColumn, ADef: string);
procedure CreateSchema;
procedure ApplyMigrations;
procedure CleanupExpired;
public
constructor Create(const ADBPath: string);
destructor Destroy; override;
procedure Lock;
procedure Unlock;
property Connection: TFDConnection read FConn;
property DBPath: string read FDBPath;
end;
var
DB: TPMDatabase;
procedure InitDatabase(const ADBPath: string);
procedure DoneDatabase;
implementation
constructor TPMDatabase.Create(const ADBPath: string);
begin
inherited Create;
FDBPath := ADBPath;
FLock := TCriticalSection.Create;
FConn := TFDConnection.Create(nil);
FConn.DriverName := 'SQLite';
FConn.Params.Values['Database'] := FDBPath;
FConn.Params.Values['LockingMode'] := 'Normal';
FConn.Params.Values['Synchronous'] := 'Normal';
FConn.Params.Values['BusyTimeout'] := '5000';
FConn.Params.Values['JournalMode'] := 'WAL';
FConn.Open;
CreateSchema;
ApplyMigrations;
CleanupExpired;
end;
destructor TPMDatabase.Destroy;
begin
FConn.Free;
FLock.Free;
inherited;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.Lock;
begin
FLock.Enter;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.Unlock;
begin
FLock.Leave;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.CreateSchema;
begin
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS users (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' username TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,' +
' password_hash TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' salt TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' hash_algo TEXT DEFAULT ''pbkdf2''' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS folders (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' name TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,' +
' UNIQUE(user_id, name)' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS vault_entries (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' site TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' username TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' encrypted_password TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' iv TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' encryption_method TEXT DEFAULT ''server'',' +
' folder TEXT DEFAULT ''All'',' +
' deleted INTEGER DEFAULT 0,' +
' deleted_at DATETIME,' +
' favorite INTEGER DEFAULT 0,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' updated_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS sessions (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' token_hash TEXT UNIQUE NOT NULL,' +
' csrf_token TEXT,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' expires_at DATETIME NOT NULL,' +
' FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS login_attempts (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' ip TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' attempted_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
// Per-username lockout state, complementing the per-IP login_attempts
// counter. On a loopback-only deployment the per-IP counter is mostly
// useless (everyone hits 127.0.0.1), so the per-username counter is the
// real defense against brute-force.
// - failed_count: total failures since the last successful auth
// - locked_until: timestamp the account becomes available again (NULL = not locked)
// - last_attempt_at / _ip: forensic info for the audit log
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS account_lockouts (' +
' username TEXT PRIMARY KEY,' +
' failed_count INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,' +
' locked_until DATETIME,' +
' last_attempt_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' last_attempt_ip TEXT' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_log (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER,' +
' action TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' ip TEXT,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS passkey_challenges (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER,' +
' challenge BLOB NOT NULL,' +
' type TEXT NOT NULL,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP' +
')');
FConn.ExecSQL(
'CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS passkey_credentials (' +
' id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,' +
' user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,' +
' credential_id BLOB NOT NULL UNIQUE,' +
' public_key BLOB NOT NULL,' +
' counter INTEGER DEFAULT 0,' +
' created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,' +
' FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE' +
')');
end;
function TPMDatabase.ColumnExists(const ATable, AColumn: string): Boolean;
var
LQ: TFDQuery;
begin
Result := False;
LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
try
LQ.Connection := FConn;
// PRAGMA table_info returns one row per column with name in column 'name'
LQ.SQL.Text := 'PRAGMA table_info(' + ATable + ')';
LQ.Open;
while not LQ.Eof do
begin
if SameText(LQ.FieldByName('name').AsString, AColumn) then
Exit(True);
LQ.Next;
end;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.AddColumnIfMissing(const ATable, AColumn, ADef: string);
begin
if not ColumnExists(ATable, AColumn) then
FConn.ExecSQL('ALTER TABLE ' + ATable + ' ADD COLUMN ' + AColumn + ' ' + ADef);
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.ApplyMigrations;
begin
// Idempotent: only ALTER when the column is actually missing — no exception
// bubbling up to the debugger like api.php's try/catch did.
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'encryption_method', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''server''');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'folder', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''All''');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'deleted', 'INTEGER DEFAULT 0');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'deleted_at', 'DATETIME');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'favorite', 'INTEGER DEFAULT 0');
// UI V2: tags stored as comma-separated TEXT (e.g. "work,important,2fa").
// Simple format, search via LIKE %tag%. Frontend handles parsing/joining.
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'tags', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''''');
// TOTP (2FA) — RFC 6238. Secret + IV are AES-GCM ciphertext / IV pair
// encrypted client-side with the user's master-derived key, exactly like
// encrypted_password. The server treats them as opaque blobs and never
// sees the plaintext secret. NULL = no TOTP configured for this entry.
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'totp_secret', 'TEXT');
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'totp_iv', 'TEXT');
AddColumnIfMissing('users', 'hash_algo', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''pbkdf2''');
// PBKDF2 iteration count per user. Legacy rows (predating this column)
// default to 100000 — the value used by api.php / the early Delphi build.
// New accounts created here use the current PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET
// (600 000 as of 2026). Login flow transparently re-hashes legacy users
// and re-encrypts their entries on the client side.
AddColumnIfMissing('users', 'kdf_iterations', 'INTEGER DEFAULT 100000');
AddColumnIfMissing('sessions', 'csrf_token', 'TEXT');
end;
procedure TPMDatabase.CleanupExpired;
begin
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE expires_at < datetime(''now'')');
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM login_attempts WHERE attempted_at < datetime(''now'', ''-15 minutes'')');
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM audit_log WHERE created_at < datetime(''now'', ''-30 days'')');
// Account lockout entries: prune rows that are no longer locked AND haven't
// been touched in 30 days (the user clearly isn't being attacked anymore).
// Active lockouts and recent attempts are preserved.
FConn.ExecSQL(
'DELETE FROM account_lockouts ' +
'WHERE (locked_until IS NULL OR locked_until < datetime(''now'')) ' +
'AND last_attempt_at < datetime(''now'', ''-30 days'')');
FConn.ExecSQL('DELETE FROM passkey_challenges WHERE created_at < datetime(''now'', ''-10 minutes'')');
end;
procedure InitDatabase(const ADBPath: string);
begin
if DB = nil then
DB := TPMDatabase.Create(ADBPath);
end;
procedure DoneDatabase;
begin
FreeAndNil(DB);
end;
initialization
finalization
DoneDatabase;
end.