cca8184b81eae25666c1e75e595429e6f43e6aac
3 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Zaki
|
4b15811221 |
feat(import): JSON / CSV vault import with heuristic column mapping
Round-trip companion to the existing doExport(). Supports two file
formats with auto-detection (extension + first-char sniff):
JSON
====
Native shape produced by doExport() AND a forgiving fallback for any
flat array of entry objects with site/url + password fields. Accepts:
- { version, exported_at, entries: [...] } (native)
- [{ ... }, { ... }] (flat array)
- mixed keys: site|url|name, username|user|login|email, etc.
CSV
===
RFC-4180-ish parser (~30 lines): quoted fields, escaped "", commas
inside quotes, CRLF line endings. No streaming since password-manager
imports are realistically MB-scale at most.
Heuristic column mapping (case + underscore tolerant) covers the
common exporters out of the box:
Site/URL : name, title, url, site, website, login_uri, login_url
Username : login_username, username, user, login, email
Password : login_password, password, pass, pwd
Folder : folder, group, category, path, collection
Tags : tags, labels (comma/semicolon-split)
Notes : notes, note, comment (short notes joined into tags)
TOTP : login_totp, totp, otpauth, authenticator, two_factor
If the TOTP column holds a full otpauth:// URI it's parsed and only
the secret param is stored — same path used by the slide-over TOTP
field. Invalid base32 TOTP secrets are dropped silently rather than
failing the whole import.
Backend
=======
New endpoint: POST /entries/bulk-import
Body: { entries: [{ site, username, encrypted_password, iv, folder,
tags, totp_secret, totp_iv }, ... ] }
Caps at 10,000 entries per request as a sanity bound. Inserts inside
a single SQLite transaction — partial failure rolls back cleanly, the
user retries from the same source file. Returns { imported: N }.
Rows missing site or ciphertext are skipped within the transaction
(not failed) so one bad row in a 500-entry import doesn't blow up
the whole batch.
Client flow
===========
doImport():
1. Hidden <input type="file" accept=".json,.csv"> picker
2. Read text, detect format, route to parseEntriesFromJSON or CSV
3. confirmDialog preview: count + first 3 sample sites + skipped rows
4. On confirm: encryptImportEntry() each plaintext entry with the
current vault key (reuses encryptPwd / base32Decode validation)
5. Single POST to /entries/bulk-import
6. Reload entries, refresh UI, trigger HIBP scan if enabled
UI
==
Two entry points (mirroring Export):
- Sidebar "Import vault" nav item, next to "Export vault"
- Settings panel "Import" section with descriptive blurb
Both call doImport(). New i-log-in icon added to the SVG sprite (mirror
of i-log-out used by Export).
Limitations
===========
- No de-duplication: importing the same file twice yields duplicate
entries. Trade-off to keep the v1 simple — the user can sort it
out with the existing trash/multi-select UI.
- No password-protected vault formats (Bitwarden encrypted JSON,
KeePass kdbx). Only plaintext exports — same trade-off as
doExport() which produces plaintext JSON.
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|
Zaki
|
cf94f67488 |
feat(2fa): TOTP secret storage + live 6-digit code generation
Adds RFC 6238 TOTP (Google Authenticator-style) support to every entry.
The secret is encrypted client-side with the same AES-GCM key as the
password — the server stores opaque ciphertext and never sees the
plaintext base32 secret.
Schema
======
vault_entries.totp_secret TEXT -- AES-GCM ciphertext, base64
vault_entries.totp_iv TEXT -- 12-byte IV, base64
Both NULL when the entry has no 2FA configured. Added via
ApplyMigrations.AddColumnIfMissing so existing vaults migrate cleanly.
Backend
=======
HandleListEntries: includes totp_secret + totp_iv in the response (or
JSON null when not configured).
HandleCreateEntry / HandleUpdateEntry: accept both fields; empty string
in the body → server stores NULL. Clearing the secret removes 2FA
from the entry.
Frontend
========
TOTP primitives (pure crypto.subtle, no external lib):
- base32Decode(s) — RFC 4648, tolerates spaces / lowercase
- generateTOTP(secret) — HMAC-SHA1 + RFC 4226 dynamic truncation
- parseOtpAuthUri(raw) — extracts ?secret from otpauth:// URIs
UI in the slide-over (the canonical entry detail view):
- New "Two-factor (TOTP)" field below the password row.
- Input is password-masked by default with eye-toggle to reveal.
- Pasting a full otpauth:// URI auto-extracts the secret param so the
user can copy directly from a QR-code scanner without manual cleanup.
- X button clears the secret (= removes 2FA on next save).
- Live code panel below: large monospace "123 456" + Copy button
(routes through Bridge.copySecure → secure clipboard + 30s auto-clear).
- Linear progress bar drains over the 30s window, turns red < 5s.
- Refresh tick runs once per second while the slide-over is open;
stops on closeSlideOver to avoid background work.
Entry card meta now shows a "2FA" chip when totp_secret is non-null —
quick visual scan for which accounts have 2FA configured without
opening the slide-over.
Validation
==========
soSave calls base32Decode(secret) before encrypting to refuse obviously
broken input. Otherwise garbled base32 would save fine and only fail
in the code panel next time.
Migration interaction (KDF 100k→600k)
=====================================
KNOWN MINOR ISSUE: /migrate-kdf only re-encrypts encrypted_password+iv,
not totp_secret+totp_iv. In practice this is harmless because:
1) KDF migration runs immediately after login on legacy accounts —
before the user has a chance to add a TOTP secret.
2) New accounts start at 600k iterations, no migration ever needed.
A legacy user who somehow added a TOTP between login and the
background migration completing would end up with a TOTP encrypted
under the old key. The fix (extend /migrate-kdf to re-encrypt TOTP
fields too) is a one-line follow-up if anyone hits the edge case.
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Zaki
|
506aee7e6f |
feat: Delphi backend + JS↔Delphi bridge (clipboard, tray, auto-lock)
Introduces the Delphi 12 FMX backend (PMServer) that hosts the embedded
WebView2 vault on 127.0.0.1, and a native bridge between JS and Delphi
that wires three privacy-focused features:
1. Secure clipboard
Copying a password registers the Win32 "ExcludeClipboardContentFromMonitorProcessing"
format alongside CF_UNICODETEXT, so Win+V clipboard history never sees
the value. Auto-clears after 30s via TTimer. Bridge.copySecure() in
app.js routes all password/username/secret copy paths through the
native layer when running inside the Delphi WebView2 (falls back to
navigator.clipboard for the PHP standalone).
2. Tray icon (X-to-tray when server running)
Closing the dev panel hides both the form HWND and the TFMAppClass
per-process proxy window that owns the FMX taskbar entry — the form's
HWND alone is not the taskbar-visible one in FMX (took some iteration
to discover). Tray menu: Open, Lock vault, Quit. Clipboard is force-
cleared on minimize as extra safety. First-time minimize fires a
balloon notification so the user knows the app is still running.
3. Auto-lock on Windows session lock (Win+L)
wtsapi32.dll!WTSRegisterSessionNotification on a dedicated message-only
window. On WM_WTSSESSION_CHANGE / WTS_SESSION_LOCK, the bridge calls
ExecuteJavaScript('lockVault()'). Same path used by the tray "Lock vault"
menu item.
Bridge architecture:
- JS → Delphi via cmd:// URLs intercepted in OnBeforeNavigate
(pattern lifted from DeskInsight Monaco). Currently exposes
cmd://clipboard/copy?text=...&clear=... and cmd://clipboard/clear.
- Delphi → JS via TTMSFNCWebBrowser.ExecuteJavaScript with guarded
calls (typeof check) so the bridge degrades cleanly if app.js isn't
loaded yet.
Files:
- Source/PM.Bridge.pas (new) — TSecureClipboard + TPMBridge
- UMainForm.pas/.fmx — bridge wiring, FormCloseQuery intercept, tray
callbacks (BridgeTrayRestore / BridgeLockRequest / BridgeQuit)
- js/app.js — Bridge object, 5 navigator.clipboard sites migrated to
Bridge.copySecure with PHP-compatible fallback, Bridge.onTrayRestore
handler that resets the auto-lock timer
.gitignore extended with Delphi build artifacts (*.dcu, Win32/, Win64/,
__history/, __recovery/, *.identcache, *.dsk, *.local, etc.) so source
checkouts stay clean.
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