Since Android 13 the system shows a preview of whatever was just copied, at the bottom of the screen. For a password that is precisely what we are trying to avoid: it appears in clear, outside the app, for several seconds. The flag that suppresses it is a ClipDescription extra, which IFMXClipboardService does not expose - hence going straight to ClipboardManager. Note Jcontent_ClipboardManager, not JClipboardManager: the latter is the deprecated android.text one, which knows only bare text and has no ClipData to carry an extra.
Backgrounding already locks; the idle timer covers the phone left face-up on a table with the app open. It samples timestamps every 15 s rather than counting seconds - a wake-up per second would cost battery for no precision that matters.
Attachments dropped from the plan: this vault has none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Works through the plan's §2 and §3 items that need no hardware and no
platform decision.
- allowBackup="false". The private directory holds vault.bin; a cloud
backup has no business in a password manager's path, even though what
would leave is encrypted by a key that stays in the chip.
- FLAG_SECURE, Release builds only - in debug it also blocks development
screenshots. Complementary to hiding on WillBecomeInactive rather than
redundant: that one covers the recents preview, the flag also covers
manual captures, screen recording and casting to an external display.
- List sorted by name (snapshot order is DB order, arbitrary to the eye),
entry icons decoded once per vault rather than on every keystroke, and a
folder dropdown whose selection survives a background refresh. No tag
filter: text search already matches tags.
- template and updated_at read and shown in the detail. updated_at is also
step 1 of the write path - nothing is arbitrable without it.
Android code is now type-checked without deploying: dccaarm64 reaches the
link step and fails only on the NDK's ldandroid.exe. A JNI declaration that
does not compile no longer waits for an APK to say so.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The detail screen showed site, username and password and silently dropped
everything else - custom fields, notes, 2FA. It is now built per entry
rather than from a fixed template: every row is a caption, a value, and
whether it is secret, so reveal and copy exist once instead of once per
kind of field.
Two rows stay special on purpose. A note's body is stored in the password
column, so it gets its own caption and no mask. The 2FA code is the only
live row - refreshed every second, placed first, since it is what you pull
a phone out for.
PMA.Totp takes bare base32 or an otpauth:// URI; both travel in snapshots
depending on how the entry was created. Checked against all six RFC 6238
vectors, including T=20000000000, which overflows 32 bits.
The rows hold plaintext, so clearing them is part of locking, not of
navigating away.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces the crypto test bench with the three screens the client actually
needs. PMA.Vault holds the decrypted snapshot and answers the search;
mainApk builds unlock/list/detail in code rather than three .fmx files.
Two safety rules live in the UI because nowhere else can hold them: the
plaintext is dropped when the app backgrounds (screen hidden on
WillBecomeInactive, which precedes the recents-preview capture), and the
clipboard is cleared after 45 s only if it still holds what we put there.
The search deliberately ignores the password field.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Keystore key now requires authentication, valid for 30 s afterwards - short enough that an unattended phone is not exploitable, long enough to decrypt and display. Time-bound rather than a per-use CryptoObject: BiometricPrompt's callback would need a Java class compiled into a jar, while FMX already bridges it.
Two aliases, because the auth constraint is fixed when the key is created and cannot be added later. The file header records which key wrote it, so a read knows whether to authenticate first.
A device with neither fingerprint nor lock screen cannot hold such a key, so SaveVault falls back to the plain key rather than giving up the cache. And a failed authentication no longer wipes the cache: the vault is intact, it is the user who cancelled - erasing it would cost a download and 4 s of derivation for a dismissed prompt.
Opening a container costs ~4 s and the iteration count belongs to the desktop format, so the fix is to stop repeating it: derive once per snapshot, then read a local AES file which the hardware accelerates. The key is generated inside the Keystore and never leaves it - the file alone is useless, even rooted.
ETag and vault are encrypted together on purpose: an ETag outliving an unreadable vault would make the server answer 304 with nothing to show. A failed read wipes the cache rather than guessing.
Also normalises every Delphi source to pure ASCII: Delphi reads a BOM-less file as ANSI, so accented comments came back as mojibake, and each PowerShell rewrite added another layer.
Fetches the opaque container and the ETag; a 304 skips both the download and the 4-second derivation, which is the whole point of keeping the tag between calls. Redirects are not followed - one to another host would send the bearer token there.
Local testing goes through adb reverse tcp:8080 tcp:80, which makes the phone reach the PC as 127.0.0.1 and satisfies the endpoint's loopback exemption. That needs usesCleartextTraffic in the manifest, marked for removal before shipping.
Two stages tested separately, because a global failure says nothing about where: PBKDF2 against the known derived key - which also runs on Win64, so that stage validates in seconds without deploying to a phone - then AES-GCM against the plaintext hash, Android only.
The vector is embedded as a unit rather than read from a file: no network, no deployment, so a first-run failure can only come from the decryption itself. Work runs on a thread; 600k HMAC rounds on the UI thread would have Android kill the app for not responding.
r-zakarya