a0a6fa883495e7a96e611511e830b82e36fa162c
17 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 r-zakarya
|
6556ce8dea |
feat(crypto): encrypt site/title/tags at rest too (CODE_AUDIT §1.3)
Extends the username-at-rest scheme to site, title and tags — the last searchable metadata still stored cleartext. Same design: dedicated <f>_enc/<f>_iv columns (AES-GCM under the vault key), decrypted at load into e.<f>, so client-side search/sort/render/favicon/autofill-match are unchanged. Full-strength random-IV AES-GCM (no searchable encryption) because search is client-side. Generalized the helpers over ENCRYPTED_META_FIELDS = [username, site, title, tags]: - withEncryptedUsername → withEncryptedMeta (encrypts all four, blanks cleartext) — wraps every POST/PUT body. - decryptEntryUsernames → decryptEntryMeta (decrypts all four at load). - migrateUsernamesAtRest → migrateMetadataAtRest (sweeps any field still cleartext, live + trash). - doChangeMasterPassword re-encrypts all four under the new key. Server (Entries + Auth + Database): - Columns site_enc/iv, title_enc/iv, tags_enc/iv; GET emits them (new AddNullableField helper); POST/PUT/bulk read+persist (BindNullable helper); rotation UPDATE re-encrypts them. - Removed the server "Site required" validation (site='' when encrypted — the client enforces it) at POST/PUT/bulk. - ?q= server search neutralized (site+username ciphertext → LIKE useless; the frontend never sends ?search=). Tests: merge assertions updated to decrypt site (encrypted on import). 65/65. username was runtime-validated earlier; site/title/tags NOT yet compiled/ runtime-tested (Delphi) — large multi-handler change. Rebuild BuildAssets + PMServer, then create/edit/dup/move/tag/import/rotate and verify the DB shows no cleartext site/title/tags (and the app still renders/searches). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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r-zakarya
|
69fb2b10dd |
feat(crypto): encrypt username at rest (CODE_AUDIT §1.3)
username is no longer stored cleartext. New columns username_enc/username_iv (AES-GCM under the vault key, same as encrypted_password). Search/sort/render stay client-side, so the field is decrypted at loadEntries into e.username in memory — everything downstream is unchanged. Full-strength random-IV AES-GCM (no searchable/deterministic encryption) precisely because search is client-side. Server (PM.Handler.Entries / .Auth / PM.Database): - Schema: vault_entries.username_enc, username_iv. - GET returns them; POST/PUT/bulk-import read + persist them; master-pw rotation re-encrypts them under the new key (UPDATE + loop). - ?q= server search drops `username LIKE` (ciphertext won't match; frontend searches client-side anyway). Client (app.js / app.import.js): - loadEntries/loadTrash decrypt username_enc → e.username (fallback to cleartext for un-migrated rows). - withEncryptedUsername(obj): write choke point — encrypts obj.username into username_enc/username_iv and blanks the cleartext. Wraps every POST/PUT body: saveEntry, soSave, duplicateEntry, moveEntryToFolder, addTagToEntry, batchMove/AddTag, encryptImportEntry (import + sync-apply). - doChangeMasterPassword re-encrypts username under the new key. - migrateUsernamesAtRest(): one-time sweep at enterApp, PUT-re-ships rows that still carry cleartext username so the DB gets scrubbed (bumps updated_at once; plaintext unchanged so devices converge). site/title/tags stay cleartext (same pattern later — see memory note). +1 merge test (username encrypted on import). 65/65. NOT compiled/tested at runtime (Delphi) — large multi-handler change; rebuild BuildAssets + PMServer and test create/edit/rotate/import/sync + verify the DB shows no cleartext username. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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r-zakarya
|
5e88ad33d1 |
feat(crypto): adopt Argon2id (argon2id-v2) on register + master-pw change
Phase 2 of CODE_AUDIT §1.2 — live adoption of the Argon2id foundation.
Verified at runtime: a rotated account shows hash_algo=argon2id-v2 with
argon2_m=19456,t=2,p=1 in vault.db.
Server (never runs Argon2 — zero-knowledge, only stores/echoes params):
- DB: users.argon2_m/t/p columns (default 0 = PBKDF2).
- PM.Handler.Auth: HASH_ALGO_ARGON2 + param bounds, ReadArgon2Params /
AppendArgon2Params helpers. /register and /change-master-password accept
hashAlgo='argon2id-v2' + argon2:{m,t,p} and persist them; /login/challenge
echoes them. Verify path (VerifierToStoredHash/CheckVerifier) is
KDF-agnostic — the 64-hex verifier is SHA256-wrapped as for any -v2 scheme.
Client (app.js):
- state.argon2Params, cached from the challenge and persisted to
sessionStorage + the quick-unlock / PIN cold-start blobs (so a cold-started
session can still derive-from-password for reauth/rotation).
- Register + master-pw rotation derive with argon2id-v2 + ARGON2_DEFAULT_PARAMS
(OWASP m=19MiB,t=2,p=1) and send the params. Rotation re-encrypts the whole
vault under the new Argon2 key (natural migration point). Existing accounts
stay PBKDF2 until they rotate.
- Params threaded through every derive-from-password site (login, reauth,
recovery setup, change-pw current verifier). Cold-start verifier-from-raw-key
paths need no params (isDecoupledVerifierAlgo handles the -v2 wrap).
Tests: +2 param-contract tests (register<->login determinism, param
sensitivity). 42/42. Assets rebuilt to embed js/argon2.js.
Docs: CLAUDE.md auth-hash section rewritten (4 markers); CODE_AUDIT §1.2 +
table + plan marked done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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r-zakarya
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d9397881dc |
test: add frontend unit suite + fix mixed local/UTC timestamps
Two CODE_AUDIT items in one session. §3.2 — Frontend regression net (js/tests/, 35 tests, node:test, zero deps): - harness.js loads app.js (monofile, no exports) into a node:vm with browser globals stubbed, surfacing internals via an export epilogue. - crypto: deriveKeyAndVerifier (AES key == raw PBKDF2, cross-checked vs Node pbkdf2Sync), legacy-vs-v2 verifier decoupling, encrypt/decrypt round-trip, IV uniqueness, AEAD tamper/wrong-key. - csv: parseCSV tokenizer, findColumn heuristics, Bitwarden/KeePass mapping. - merge: applyRemoteSnapshot add/update/skip (LWW), tombstone delete, resurrection arbitration (both NaN branches), local-tombstone veto, additive folder merge. Only api() is stubbed; loadEntries/encryptImportEntry run for real. - Wired as a build gate in BuildAssets.ps1 (after node --check, bypass PM_SKIP_TESTS=1). §2.2 — Unify timestamps on UTC: - Entry created_at/updated_at were written via Delphi FormatDateTime(Now) = LOCAL, while deleted_at/tombstones use SQLite CURRENT_TIMESTAMP = UTC. The tombstone-resurrection arbitration compared the two zones, skewing by the machine's UTC offset even single-device. - Add NowUTC/NowUTCStr to PM.Database, swap in at every entry/attachment write site (Entries create/update/bulk, Attachments POST echo). - No JS change needed: arbitration now compares same-zone values. - Existing rows self-heal on next edit (no destructive migration). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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r-zakarya
|
ac909f4f09 |
feat: sync ETag concurrency + fix chunk-transfer hang + sync overlay + auto-VACUUM
Sync optimistic concurrency (ETag/If-Match) - webdav GET captures the response ETag; PUT sends it back as If-Match so the server rejects (412) our write when another device changed the file between our pull and push. A 412 re-runs the whole pull→merge→push (bounded to 3) so the other device's changes are folded in instead of clobbered. Servers without ETags → empty etag → no If-Match → falls back to last-write-wins (no regression). onWebdavResult gained a 4th etag arg. Chunked webdav PUT (big vaults no longer black-screen on sync) - The whole encrypted snapshot base64'd into a single cmd://webdav/put URL blew past WebView2's cap → black screen once the vault grew (20MB of attachments). PUT bodies now stream through the file/chunk transport and commit via a new webdav/put-commit (reads the accumulated buffer). Chunk-transfer hang fix (root cause of the stuck "Preparing…" sync) - All chunked transfers (saveFile/writeFile/webdav PUT) share one reqId-keyed resolver. A resolved chunk's stale 30s timeout would later delete the CURRENT chunk's resolver and fire the wrong res(), leaving that chunk's await pending forever. Extracted a single _streamChunks() helper whose ack CLEARS the pending timeout, so resolvers stay strictly one-at-a-time. Also fixed _webdavCall referencing the Bridge-local cmd() from module scope (latent ReferenceError). Sync busy overlay - syncStatus() now drives the global busy overlay too, so a running sync blocks stray clicks (e.g. the auto-backup "Choose…" picker) and reads like the manual backup. The account-mismatch confirm hideBusy()s first so it's visible above the overlay. Auto-VACUUM (reclaim space after deleting large attachments) - SQLite never shrinks the file on DELETE, so deleting big attachments left vault.db bloated (35MB for 11 tiny entries). DB.CompactIfBloated VACUUMs when >20% of pages are free AND >~2MB is reclaimable — called on startup and after each attachment delete. A healthy small vault pays nothing. (Verified: 35MB → 695KB after the deletes.) Rebuild: BuildAssets + F9 (UMainForm + PM.Database + PM.Handler.Attachments). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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r-zakarya
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7440d07793 |
feat: profile avatar + tombstone-restore fix + WebView2 nav race + sync summary
Profile picture / avatar - users.avatar_b64 column (nullable, cosmetic, not encrypted) + GET/POST /avatar endpoints mirroring the settings handler pattern. - Top-right chip + Settings→Account show a round avatar: custom picture if set, otherwise the username's initial on a deterministic hash-picked colour (stable across renders). - Upload downscales + center-crops to a 128px JPEG via FileReader → data: URI (NOT blob:, which the CSP's `img-src 'self' data:` blocks) before POSTing. Remove button clears it. - Carried in the encrypted JSON export; restored on import only when the current account has no picture (never clobbers a local one). Tombstone restore-then-sync fix - POST /entries and POST /entries/bulk-import now DELETE any tombstone matching an inserted uuid (same transaction) so a restored backup isn't re-killed on the next sync by its own stale tombstone. - applyRemoteSnapshot arbitrates remote tombstones by timestamp: a tombstone is skipped when the local entry with that uuid is newer than deleted_at (resurrection wins). Ties / unparseable timestamps favour KEEP. loadEntries() up front so updated_at reflects the live rows. WebView2 navigation race - Black-window-on-cold-start fix: the 1.5s nav timer no longer consumes FPendingURL when WebView2 isn't initialised yet (it re-arms, bounded to ~10 retries). FBrowserInitialized flag set in OnInitialized; after the retry budget we Navigate best-effort rather than loop forever. Sync UX - Bidirectional toast: "pulled X new · Y updated · Z deleted · pushed N entries" so a 0/0/0 pull still shows the vault was uploaded. - FolderPOST/PUT: pre-declare ftString on color/icon params (fixes the earlier [SQLite]-335 on NULL bind, already in play for CSV import). Docs - CLAUDE.md sync section documents tombstone purge-on-insert + resurrection arbitration. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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r-zakarya
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6869b7c692 |
feat: WebDAV sync + batch DnD + clean shutdown + center-modal UX bundle
- Sync (WebDAV, auto-merge): UUID + tombstones foundations (server + JS), THTTPClient bridge cmds (get/put/test), runSyncNow engine with pull/merge/push flow, Settings UI, pre-sync backup option. Test connection now treats 404 as OK (snapshot not yet created) and 401/ 403 as auth failure with dedicated toast. - Batch drag-drop: cards + table rows carry checked-set ids (CSV) when dragged from an active selection; folder + trash drop handlers parse and apply in batch via new moveEntriesToFolder helper that preserves TOTP / custom_fields / kind in the full PUT payload. - Clean shutdown: WM_QUERYENDSESSION / WM_ENDSESSION captured in the bridge message-only window; FormCloseQuery bypasses the tray-minimize intercept on system shutdown / restart / logoff so FireDAC closes the SQLite WAL cleanly instead of leaving -shm / -wal residue after a force-kill. - Center-mode modal: blur+dim backdrop via body::before pseudo-element in editor-position=center, swallows clicks below the panel so the existing outside-click handlers reliably dismiss the slideover / settings panel. - Batch bar state fixes: state.checked cleared before render in moveEntriesToFolder, emptyTrash, and per-card restoreEntry / permanentDelete / deleteEntry so the action bar disappears once the selection is fully processed. - Save-then-discard duplicate fix: soState reset to null before openSlideOver re-opens the freshly saved entry, otherwise the dirty check fired on the soState.id=null → newId switch and a Cancel left the form in new-entry mode (second Save → POST duplicate). - TEST_SYNC.md: end-to-end checklist for validating the WebDAV sync with 2 real instances. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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r-zakarya
|
e23a78dda7 |
feat: entry templates + tag autocomplete + slideover push + robustness bundle
- Entry templates: new vault_entries.template column drives a typed
sub-kind ('credit-card', 'ssh-key', 'server', 'recovery-codes'). Card
+ table label off the template, badge reads "credit card" instead of
"note". Templates seed kind=note (no site/password required), use
custom_fields with optional dropdown options (brand, month/year,
protocol). Round-tripped across export/import/duplicate/master-pw
rotation, preserved by partial PUTs via a HasTemplate flag.
- Custom fields: support per-field `options[]` rendering as <select>
(card brand, expiry MM/YYYY, SSH/server protocol).
- Tags: existing-tag autocomplete dropdown under the chip input,
filtered against what's already selected.
- Search history: per-query X for individual delete + 1s debounced
commit (no Enter required).
- Slideover: clicking outside closes again (drag-selection respected
via mousedown origin tracker), Esc closes, X closes. App shell is
pushed left by 420px when the panel is open so the table / pagination
/ sort / search stay visible and interactive.
- Export/import: JSON now round-trips custom_fields, attachments
(decrypted to base64, re-encrypted under current key on restore),
icon_b64, and template. CSV warning lists what's not included.
- Auto-backup: same payload shape as user-driven export.
- Notes: import (JSON + CSV) accepts kind=note with empty site,
preserves title/template/custom_fields. CSV parser detects kind/
template columns.
- Bulk-import response returns `ids[]` parallel to input so the
client can map back to new entry IDs (drives attachment restore).
- Move-to-folder bugs fixed: moveEntryToFolder, batchMoveToFolder,
addTag, batchAddTag were all silently wiping TOTP / custom_fields
/ kind / template via partial PUT. Now re-ship full payload.
- Master-pw rotation: server mints a fresh session token + csrf so
the very next request after rotation no longer ESessionRejects.
Client adopts the new pair. Attachments are re-encrypted client-side
during rotation (GET old → decrypt with old key → encrypt with new
→ PUT). New endpoints: GET /attachments/all, PUT /attachments/:id.
- Duplicate: carries icon_b64 + template + attachments to the copy.
- HandleCreateEntry: accepts icon_b64.
- FireDAC param fix: all blob/icon/custom_fields params use ftMemo +
.Value assignment so SQLite TEXT no longer truncates to 4000 chars
(deepseek's 200+ KB favicon was being wiped on lock/unlock).
- HandleSetEntryIcon cap: 262144 → 524288 chars (base64 of a 256 KB
raw fetch overflows the old cap, fails silently in saveEntryIcon).
- Native save dialog: surfaces server errors instead of swallowing.
- Modals: reauth (export) + backup-password prompt support inline
error display, retry up to 5 attempts, then hard-stop.
- Keyboard cursor (j/k): bootstraps to current page, auto-paginates
when the cursor crosses a page boundary, Enter opens slideover.
- Slideover focuses Title on edit-open so j/k → Enter → type Just
Works.
- TOTP tool: Esc closes the modal.
- App version + launch mode (auto/manual): exposed via bridge,
surfaced in Settings → Account. Autostart launches suppress the
first-time tray balloon.
- Passkey button hidden (Delphi backend stubs WebAuthn at 501).
- TEST_PLAN.md captured for regression coverage.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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 Zaki
|
fa7ea191be |
feat: native save + auto-backup + folder customization + attachments + UX bundle
- File: native Save As dialog via Bridge.saveFile (replaces WebView2
browser download popup) for encrypted JSON + CSV exports.
- Auto-backup: silent periodic encrypted JSON to a chosen folder,
user-set interval + retention, separate DPAPI-stored password, runs
5s after unlock if due. New file/* bridge cmds (folder/pick,
file/write, file/listMatch, file/delete).
- Folders: per-folder color + icon (8-swatch palette, 8 icon presets),
drag-reorder via HTML5 DnD with insert-line indicators, edit pencil
on hover. New POST /folders/reorder + PUT /folders/{name}. Folder
chip on cards inherits custom icon + color.
- Recently used: vault_entries.accessed_at + POST /entries/{id}/touch
(debounced 2s), sidebar Tools entry showing top-10 by accessed_at.
- Encrypted attachments: per-entry file storage (5MB cap), AES-GCM
with vault key, native Save As download, paperclip upload in
slideover. New entry_attachments table + PM.Handler.Attachments.
- Password expiry: vault_entries.password_changed_at (conditional bump
via SQL CASE only when ciphertext differs), passwordExpiryDays
setting, "Aged" badge on cards + matching Filters chip.
- Recovery: Print button on generated code modal (A4 printable sheet
via @media print, code in 32px monospace + instructions).
- Audit log viewer (sidebar Tools, GET /audit with pagination cursor).
- Plaintext CSV export + Filters dropdown with 9 predicates.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Zaki
|
63fac5b3b7 |
feat: secure notes + password history + custom fields + quick-win bundle
Big feature trio
- Secure notes (kind='login'|'note') reusing the encrypted_password+iv
pipeline for the body. New sidebar entry, slideover variant (title +
multiline body), distinct card / table-view rendering, badge in name
column, copy-content button replacing the password copy on note rows.
- Password history: entries_password_history table keeps up to 20 prior
ciphertexts per entry. HandleUpdateEntry pushes the pre-update
encrypted_password into history ONLY when it actually differs from
the incoming one (JS reuses originalEncrypted bit-for-bit when the
plaintext is unchanged — avoids spamming history on title/folder edits).
GET /entries/{id}/history endpoint. Slideover modal lists versions
with mask/reveal/copy/revert. Master-pw rotation wipes history (old
ciphertext can't be decrypted with the new key).
- Custom fields: per-entry encrypted JSON array of {label, value,
is_secret}. Same crypto pipeline as the password. Slideover row UI
with label/value inputs, secret toggle (eye), copy, delete. Re-
encryption flows through bulk-import, change-master-password, and
duplicate.
Quick wins
- Cheatsheet overlay (press '?' or topbar button or Ctrl+K). Lists all
hotkeys + global / tray / card actions. SVG icons inline so the
cheatsheet matches the actual app glyphs (no emoji mismatch).
- Open URL button on entry cards: ShellExecute via cmd://app/open-url,
http(s) only, validates entry.site looks like a real hostname.
- Trash auto-purge: setting "Empty trash after N days" (never/7/30/90).
DELETE /entries/trash/old?days=N called at every unlock.
Favicon strategy
- Subdomains (chat.deepseek.com, app.X.com…) now try the SLD first
(deepseek.com.ico) before the full host. DDG often returns a generic
placeholder for subdomains that passes the byte threshold; the SLD-first
switch surfaces the real brand icon.
- Cap bumped 64 KB → 256 KB on all three sides (Delphi fetch, server
endpoint, JS upload). DDG sometimes serves the full-res asset.
UX polish
- Click-outside-slideover: stopPropagation everywhere it bites. Custom
fields buttons (add / delete / secret toggle / copy / eye) all stop
the click bubble so the document-level "close on outside click" handler
doesn't fire when rerender() detaches the target from the DOM.
- Native search-cancel button restyled: cyan accent X via mask-image,
cursor: pointer, breathing room before the Ctrl+K kbd chip.
- Password history modal: scrollable body, multiline wrapped passwords,
hover border highlight.
- Cheatsheet panel widened (560 → 720 px) so the descriptions no longer
ellipsis-clip.
- "+ New" topbar splits into a small dropdown: New login / New note.
- Notes show a "note" badge in table-view name column, italic
"Encrypted note" placeholder in the username column.
Internals
- duplicateEntry copies kind + custom_fields too (one-line forgotten
earlier).
- entries_password_history dropped on master-pw rotation — the old
ciphertexts are unrecoverable with the new key.
- bulk-import re-encryption path includes custom_fields.
CLAUDE.md
- "Entry payload — call sites à toucher ensemble" lists the 6 spots
to update when adding a new (en)crypted field. Notes the historical
miss of kind in duplicateEntry and custom_fields in the rotation +
duplicate.
Repo hygiene
- .gitattributes forces CRLF on Delphi sources (RAD Studio refuses LF).
text=auto for web frontend / docs, binary for .res / .exe / images.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Zaki
|
ad5fb21a18 |
feat: website favicons + vault health dashboard
Favicons
- PM.Favicon (new): THTTPClient/WinHTTP proxy to icons.duckduckgo.com.
Native Windows TLS — no OpenSSL DLLs to ship (Indy would fail
silently without them). 5 s timeout, max 3 redirects, 64 KB cap,
magic-byte MIME sniffing.
- DB: vault_entries.icon_b64 TEXT (idempotent migration).
- Endpoints: POST /entries/{id}/icon stores a cached data URI without
forcing a full PUT (which would re-encrypt the password). DELETE
/entries/icons/all purges the cache.
- Bridge cmd://favicon/fetch?host=X&reqId=Y runs in an anonymous thread
so the up-to-5 s HTTP GET doesn't block the main thread; result
shipped back via Bridge.onFaviconResult(reqId, host, dataUri).
- Hostname validated on both sides (JS faviconHost + Delphi
NormalizeHost) so brand labels like "Gitea" never leak upstream.
- Settings: opt-in "Fetch website icons" toggle (synced), three explicit
actions (Fetch missing / Re-fetch all / Clear cache) that bypass the
toggle — manual user actions always work.
- Entry card avatar shows <img> when cached, falls back to initials.
onerror handler recovers silently from a corrupt data URI.
Vault health
- New sidebar Tools → "Vault health" view. Four category cards:
Weak (strength < 50), Reused (same plaintext on ≥ 2 entries), Old
(updated_at > 365d), Pwned (HIBP cache).
- Score 0-100 with colour band (Good/Fair/At risk/Critical).
- One-shot computation cached per session (healthCache), invalidated
on lockVault, entry save, and the explicit "Recompute" button.
- "Fix" button on each item opens the slideover for the affected
entry, unmasks the password, focuses it, and pulses the dice button
— full context preserved, user decides how to fix.
- Click handler stopPropagation prevents the document-level
"click outside slideover" listener from closing the panel that
we just opened in the same click event.
Fixes
- openSlideover typo (lowercase O) → openSlideOver across all call
sites. Was silently breaking the Authenticator card click and the
Vault health Fix button.
- W1050 WideChar warning in PM.Favicon — replaced set-membership
with explicit Ord-style range comparisons.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Zaki
|
40b3154a34 |
feat: MFA tools, single-instance, tray polish, prefs persistence
Session highlights:
- feat(prefs): DPAPI-backed key/value store (PM.UserPrefs) — fixes
rememberedUsername being lost across reboots due to the random
ephemeral HTTP port changing the localStorage origin every launch.
Bridge cmd://prefs/{get,set} round-trips through Delphi.
- feat(tray): icon visible from startup (NIM_ADD at constructor, not
at first minimize). Tray context menu themed via uxtheme!135
SetPreferredAppMode so it follows the app's dark/light setting.
- feat(single-instance): named mutex + RegisterWindowMessage broadcast.
Second launch posts WM_PMSHOW to HWND_BROADCAST and exits; the
running bridge restores the window from tray. Mutex lives in Local\
namespace so distinct Windows users can still each run one.
- feat(mfa): Authenticator sidebar view (live TOTP codes for every
entry with a secret) + standalone TOTP generator modal (paste
base32 / otpauth:// URI, or generate a random 20-byte secret).
- feat(sidebar): Folders / Tags / Tools sections collapsible with
chevron toggle. Badge counts stay visible when collapsed. State
persisted in settings_json (synced across devices).
- feat(autofill): hotkey when vault is locked now restores the app
and focuses the master password input instead of no-op'ing
silently. Cleaner UX for the common "I hit Ctrl+Shift+L but the
vault was locked" path.
- feat(quick-unlock): when enabled, skip lockVault on Windows lock /
sleep. Rationale: the DPAPI blob already gates access via the
Windows account, so re-locking on top of the OS lock is redundant.
Idle auto-lock still fires (separate opt-in).
- fix(quick-unlock): re-sync state.quickUnlockEnabled from DPAPI
source-of-truth at boot, instead of trusting (now-volatile)
localStorage.
- docs: CLAUDE.md updated with all new modules, bridge commands,
and the port-ephemeral pitfall.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Zaki
|
01c56edf25 |
feat(recovery): single-use recovery code for forgotten master password
In a zero-knowledge vault, forgetting the master password normally
means losing the data — the AES key is derived from the master pw
and the server can't help. This commit adds the standard escape
hatch: a one-time recovery code that key-wraps the AES key so the
user can get back in.
Threat model
============
The plaintext recovery code is shown to the user exactly once, at
generation time. Server only ever stores SHA-256(code) + an AES-GCM
wrap of the vault key under a KEK = PBKDF2(code, kdf_salt, 600k).
Without the plaintext code the server cannot unwrap. The code is
high-entropy (96 bits from a 32-char ambiguity-free alphabet, in 4
groups of 4) — printed form is misreading-resistant.
Single use: redeeming deletes the row inside the same DB.Lock the
lookup happened in, so concurrent redeem attempts are race-free.
Failed redemptions feed both the per-IP rate limit AND the per-
username lockout, so brute-forcing the code is infeasible.
Schema
======
recovery_keys (
user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY (1:1 with users, FK cascade),
code_hash TEXT NOT NULL (SHA-256 hex of plaintext code),
kdf_salt TEXT NOT NULL (PBKDF2 salt for KEK derivation),
wrapped_key TEXT NOT NULL (base64 AES-GCM ciphertext of vault key),
wrapped_iv TEXT NOT NULL (base64 12B IV for the wrap),
created_at DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
)
Backend: new unit PM.Handler.Recovery
=====================================
GET /recovery-key/status (auth) -> { configured, created_at? }
POST /recovery-key/setup (auth + CSRF) body {masterPassword, codeHash,
kdfSalt, wrappedKey, wrappedIv}
DELETE /recovery-key (auth + CSRF) -> remove config
POST /recovery-key/redeem (NO auth) body {username, code}
-> session + wrappedKey + wrappedIv + kdfSalt
+ user's current salt + kdfIterations
VerifyMasterPassword() helper handles both legacy 'pbkdf2' and
current 'pbkdf2-sha256' schemes consistently with PM.Handler.Auth.
Setup flow
==========
1. Settings → "Generate recovery code" button (asks master pw via reauth).
2. Client generates: 16-char code + fresh kdf_salt + exports the current
AES key via crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw').
3. Client wraps the raw key under KEK=PBKDF2(code, kdf_salt, 600k)
with a random 12B IV → base64.
4. POSTs to /recovery-key/setup. Server verifies master pw, INSERT-or-
replaces the row (DELETE+INSERT, no UPSERT — same pattern as the
lockout table since FireDAC's UPSERT support is patchy).
5. Confirm modal shows the plaintext code in a monospace, user-select-all
panel. The modal is forcing: "I saved it" button is the only way out.
Modal is the only place the code ever appears — server never sees it.
Redeem flow (forgot master pw)
==============================
1. Auth screen → "Forgot master password? Use a recovery code" link.
2. promptDialog: username, then code (masked input).
3. POST /recovery-key/redeem. Server hashes the typed code, joins with
users by username, ConstantTimeEquals against stored hash. On match:
- deletes the recovery_keys row (single-use)
- issues a fresh session token + CSRF
- returns: { token, csrfToken, salt, kdfIterations, kdfSalt,
wrappedKey, wrappedIv, userId }
4. Client unwraps the AES key with PBKDF2(code, kdfSalt, 600k) → raw bytes
→ importKey('raw') back into a CryptoKey.
5. State is reconstituted from the new session, persistCryptoKey, enterApp.
6. Client immediately opens the Change-master-password modal — the
recovery code is consumed and the account needs a fresh master pw
AND a fresh recovery code (the user generates a new one from Settings).
Backward compat
===============
Recovery is opt-in. Existing users see "No recovery key set" in Settings
until they generate one. No migration needed — the table is created via
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS at server startup, FK cascade on user delete.
Minor UI additions
==================
- .btn-link CSS class for the auth-screen "Forgot master password?" link.
- Recovery-status label in Settings refreshed on every openSettings()
via GET /recovery-key/status.
|
||
|
Zaki
|
cf94f67488 |
feat(2fa): TOTP secret storage + live 6-digit code generation
Adds RFC 6238 TOTP (Google Authenticator-style) support to every entry.
The secret is encrypted client-side with the same AES-GCM key as the
password — the server stores opaque ciphertext and never sees the
plaintext base32 secret.
Schema
======
vault_entries.totp_secret TEXT -- AES-GCM ciphertext, base64
vault_entries.totp_iv TEXT -- 12-byte IV, base64
Both NULL when the entry has no 2FA configured. Added via
ApplyMigrations.AddColumnIfMissing so existing vaults migrate cleanly.
Backend
=======
HandleListEntries: includes totp_secret + totp_iv in the response (or
JSON null when not configured).
HandleCreateEntry / HandleUpdateEntry: accept both fields; empty string
in the body → server stores NULL. Clearing the secret removes 2FA
from the entry.
Frontend
========
TOTP primitives (pure crypto.subtle, no external lib):
- base32Decode(s) — RFC 4648, tolerates spaces / lowercase
- generateTOTP(secret) — HMAC-SHA1 + RFC 4226 dynamic truncation
- parseOtpAuthUri(raw) — extracts ?secret from otpauth:// URIs
UI in the slide-over (the canonical entry detail view):
- New "Two-factor (TOTP)" field below the password row.
- Input is password-masked by default with eye-toggle to reveal.
- Pasting a full otpauth:// URI auto-extracts the secret param so the
user can copy directly from a QR-code scanner without manual cleanup.
- X button clears the secret (= removes 2FA on next save).
- Live code panel below: large monospace "123 456" + Copy button
(routes through Bridge.copySecure → secure clipboard + 30s auto-clear).
- Linear progress bar drains over the 30s window, turns red < 5s.
- Refresh tick runs once per second while the slide-over is open;
stops on closeSlideOver to avoid background work.
Entry card meta now shows a "2FA" chip when totp_secret is non-null —
quick visual scan for which accounts have 2FA configured without
opening the slide-over.
Validation
==========
soSave calls base32Decode(secret) before encrypting to refuse obviously
broken input. Otherwise garbled base32 would save fine and only fail
in the code panel next time.
Migration interaction (KDF 100k→600k)
=====================================
KNOWN MINOR ISSUE: /migrate-kdf only re-encrypts encrypted_password+iv,
not totp_secret+totp_iv. In practice this is harmless because:
1) KDF migration runs immediately after login on legacy accounts —
before the user has a chance to add a TOTP secret.
2) New accounts start at 600k iterations, no migration ever needed.
A legacy user who somehow added a TOTP between login and the
background migration completing would end up with a TOTP encrypted
under the old key. The fix (extend /migrate-kdf to re-encrypt TOTP
fields too) is a one-line follow-up if anyone hits the edge case.
|
||
|
Zaki
|
e0e452306e |
feat(crypto): PBKDF2 iterations 100k → 600k with transparent re-encryption
Bumps the PBKDF2-SHA256 iteration count from 100,000 (OWASP 2017) to
600,000 (OWASP 2023). 6x slowdown on every brute-force attempt against
either the server-stored auth hash OR the AES-GCM ciphertext of the
entries — both currently use the same PBKDF2 output (see KNOWN ISSUE
below for why that's another problem to fix later).
Schema
======
users.kdf_iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 100000
Per-user iteration count. Legacy rows predating the column default
to 100k via the DEFAULT clause. New accounts insert 600k explicitly.
Migration flow
==============
Atomic from the user's perspective. No partial state ever persisted.
1. /login (or /reauth):
server reads users.kdf_iterations and verifies the master pw at
that count. Login succeeds at the legacy strength. Response now
includes kdfIterations (current) and optionally kdfMigration =
{ target: 600000 } when an upgrade is recommended.
2. Client:
derives the AES key at the OLD count to decrypt current entries
(state.cryptoKey). enterApp() loads the vault normally.
3. runKdfMigration() (background, after enterApp):
- derives the NEW key at target iterations
- decrypts every entry with the old key
- re-encrypts every entry with the new key + fresh random IVs
- POSTs { masterPassword, entries: [...] } to /migrate-kdf
4. /migrate-kdf (new endpoint):
- verifies the master pw against the OLD hash
- in a single transaction:
UPDATE users SET password_hash = pbkdf2(pw, salt, 600k),
kdf_iterations = 600000
UPDATE vault_entries SET encrypted_password, iv (per entry)
- on any failure: ROLLBACK. User stays at legacy config, retries
at next login. No half-migrated state possible.
5. Client (post-commit):
swaps state.cryptoKey to the new key, persists it, updates the
cached ciphertext in state.entries, shows a "Vault security
upgraded" toast.
Idempotency: server's /migrate-kdf short-circuits with "Already at
target" if users.kdf_iterations >= PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET.
Race conditions: two concurrent migrations from two tabs both
recompute the SAME new key (deterministic PBKDF2). The losing
transaction's entries get re-encrypted with the winning one's IVs,
but both clients can decrypt because the keys are identical.
KNOWN ISSUE (not fixed by this commit)
======================================
The server's password_hash IS the client's AES key, in hex form —
both sides compute PBKDF2(pw, salt, iters) and store/use the same
32 bytes. This means a stolen vault.db gives the attacker the
encryption key directly, without needing to brute-force anything.
The 100k → 600k bump still helps because the AES-GCM ciphertext
itself is also a brute-force target, but the architectural fix
(server stores SHA256(aes_key) instead of aes_key in hex) is a
separate concern that needs its own migration.
Other changes
=============
- HandleRegister: new accounts insert kdf_iterations=600000.
- HandleReauth: response upgraded to JSON with kdfIterations
+ optional kdfMigration. Unlock path now also triggers migration.
- SendAuthSuccess: extended signature, all callers updated.
- deriveKey(pwd, saltHex, iterations) in app.js: iterations param
required, defaults to 100000 for back-compat with any legacy caller.
|
||
|
Zaki
|
9f6636defc |
feat(auth): per-account brute-force lockout with exponential backoff
Existing protection was per-IP only (login_attempts table). On a loopback
deployment everyone hits 127.0.0.1, so the per-IP counter is mostly
ornamental — the real attacker is on the same machine. Adds a second
defense layer that tracks failures per username with an exponential
backoff schedule.
Schema:
account_lockouts (username TEXT PK, failed_count INT,
locked_until DATETIME, last_attempt_at, last_attempt_ip)
Backoff after threshold (4+ failures):
1, 2, 3 failures → no lockout (grace window for typos)
4th → 60 s
5th → 5 min
6th → 15 min
7th → 1 h
8th → 6 h
9th and beyond → 24 h (capped)
Counter resets to 0 on successful login or reauth. Old non-locked rows
older than 30 days are pruned by CleanupExpired alongside the existing
sessions / audit_log / login_attempts cleanups.
Wiring:
- HandleLogin / HandleReauth both check RejectIfAccountLocked() before
touching the users table. Lockout responses are 429 with JSON body
{ error, retry_after } and a Retry-After header.
- Failed attempts are recorded against the username even when the user
doesn't exist, preventing account enumeration via differential
"is this account locked?" probes.
- PBKDF2 hash comparison was already constant-time (ConstantTimeEquals);
no change there.
Client (js/app.js):
- api() now preserves response status + body on Error so callers can
distinguish 429-lockout from other errors.
- New showLockoutCountdown(seconds) renders a live "Account locked —
try again in Xm Ys" message in #authHint, disables #loginBtn until
the countdown reaches 0, then re-enables it.
- doLogin / doUnlock both branch on err.status === 429 + retry_after
to call showLockoutCountdown instead of a generic error toast.
Known limitation: an attacker can DoS-lock arbitrary usernames by
spamming /login with that name. This is intentional — the alternative
(per-(username,IP) tracking) would let attackers enumerate accounts.
DoS-lock is acceptable; auth bypass is not.
|
||
|
Zaki
|
506aee7e6f |
feat: Delphi backend + JS↔Delphi bridge (clipboard, tray, auto-lock)
Introduces the Delphi 12 FMX backend (PMServer) that hosts the embedded
WebView2 vault on 127.0.0.1, and a native bridge between JS and Delphi
that wires three privacy-focused features:
1. Secure clipboard
Copying a password registers the Win32 "ExcludeClipboardContentFromMonitorProcessing"
format alongside CF_UNICODETEXT, so Win+V clipboard history never sees
the value. Auto-clears after 30s via TTimer. Bridge.copySecure() in
app.js routes all password/username/secret copy paths through the
native layer when running inside the Delphi WebView2 (falls back to
navigator.clipboard for the PHP standalone).
2. Tray icon (X-to-tray when server running)
Closing the dev panel hides both the form HWND and the TFMAppClass
per-process proxy window that owns the FMX taskbar entry — the form's
HWND alone is not the taskbar-visible one in FMX (took some iteration
to discover). Tray menu: Open, Lock vault, Quit. Clipboard is force-
cleared on minimize as extra safety. First-time minimize fires a
balloon notification so the user knows the app is still running.
3. Auto-lock on Windows session lock (Win+L)
wtsapi32.dll!WTSRegisterSessionNotification on a dedicated message-only
window. On WM_WTSSESSION_CHANGE / WTS_SESSION_LOCK, the bridge calls
ExecuteJavaScript('lockVault()'). Same path used by the tray "Lock vault"
menu item.
Bridge architecture:
- JS → Delphi via cmd:// URLs intercepted in OnBeforeNavigate
(pattern lifted from DeskInsight Monaco). Currently exposes
cmd://clipboard/copy?text=...&clear=... and cmd://clipboard/clear.
- Delphi → JS via TTMSFNCWebBrowser.ExecuteJavaScript with guarded
calls (typeof check) so the bridge degrades cleanly if app.js isn't
loaded yet.
Files:
- Source/PM.Bridge.pas (new) — TSecureClipboard + TPMBridge
- UMainForm.pas/.fmx — bridge wiring, FormCloseQuery intercept, tray
callbacks (BridgeTrayRestore / BridgeLockRequest / BridgeQuit)
- js/app.js — Bridge object, 5 navigator.clipboard sites migrated to
Bridge.copySecure with PHP-compatible fallback, Bridge.onTrayRestore
handler that resets the auto-lock timer
.gitignore extended with Delphi build artifacts (*.dcu, Win32/, Win64/,
__history/, __recovery/, *.identcache, *.dsk, *.local, etc.) so source
checkouts stay clean.
|