URL and token are no longer constants. They sit in settings.bin, sealed with the no-auth Keystore AES key - deliberately weaker than the vault: they must be readable to rebuild a vault that no longer exists, and a bearer token only opens ENCRYPTED data, worthless without the sync password that stays in the guarded vault. Retyping 64 hex characters after every cache purge was the real risk: the risk of writing them down elsewhere. They are saved only after a fetch that worked - proven settings, not typed ones.
The token and sync password moved to the gitignored local include, as first-run defaults only. Tracked source now carries no secret, and leaving them empty is a viable configuration: the app asks.
Theme: Delphi's Dark.style, copied into the repo and linked as a resource rather than deployed as a file - this project's deployment puts nothing beside the app, which is the same hole that forces the manifest and dex staging. A failure to load is never fatal; the default look is ugly but works.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
generateSecret takes a KeySpec; passing a JObject made the bridge emit a signature no method matches, and the call failed at runtime. Swallowed as 'unavailable', which hid my own mistake for a full test round - the failure now carries its exception message.
Measured on device: the Pascal PBKDF2 takes 6651 ms, unusable per unlock. AES-GCM through JNI works, plaintext and hash match the vector, so the container format is validated end to end.
Two stages tested separately, because a global failure says nothing about where: PBKDF2 against the known derived key - which also runs on Win64, so that stage validates in seconds without deploying to a phone - then AES-GCM against the plaintext hash, Android only.
The vector is embedded as a unit rather than read from a file: no network, no deployment, so a first-run failure can only come from the decryption itself. Work runs on a thread; 600k HMAC rounds on the UI thread would have Android kill the app for not responding.
r-zakarya