Commit Graph

12 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
r-zakarya 7440d07793 feat: profile avatar + tombstone-restore fix + WebView2 nav race + sync summary
Profile picture / avatar
- users.avatar_b64 column (nullable, cosmetic, not encrypted) + GET/POST
  /avatar endpoints mirroring the settings handler pattern.
- Top-right chip + Settings→Account show a round avatar: custom picture
  if set, otherwise the username's initial on a deterministic
  hash-picked colour (stable across renders).
- Upload downscales + center-crops to a 128px JPEG via FileReader →
  data: URI (NOT blob:, which the CSP's `img-src 'self' data:` blocks)
  before POSTing. Remove button clears it.
- Carried in the encrypted JSON export; restored on import only when the
  current account has no picture (never clobbers a local one).

Tombstone restore-then-sync fix
- POST /entries and POST /entries/bulk-import now DELETE any tombstone
  matching an inserted uuid (same transaction) so a restored backup
  isn't re-killed on the next sync by its own stale tombstone.
- applyRemoteSnapshot arbitrates remote tombstones by timestamp: a
  tombstone is skipped when the local entry with that uuid is newer than
  deleted_at (resurrection wins). Ties / unparseable timestamps favour
  KEEP. loadEntries() up front so updated_at reflects the live rows.

WebView2 navigation race
- Black-window-on-cold-start fix: the 1.5s nav timer no longer consumes
  FPendingURL when WebView2 isn't initialised yet (it re-arms, bounded
  to ~10 retries). FBrowserInitialized flag set in OnInitialized; after
  the retry budget we Navigate best-effort rather than loop forever.

Sync UX
- Bidirectional toast: "pulled X new · Y updated · Z deleted · pushed N
  entries" so a 0/0/0 pull still shows the vault was uploaded.
- FolderPOST/PUT: pre-declare ftString on color/icon params (fixes the
  earlier [SQLite]-335 on NULL bind, already in play for CSV import).

Docs
- CLAUDE.md sync section documents tombstone purge-on-insert +
  resurrection arbitration.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-02 23:36:36 +01:00
r-zakarya 6869b7c692 feat: WebDAV sync + batch DnD + clean shutdown + center-modal UX bundle
- Sync (WebDAV, auto-merge): UUID + tombstones foundations (server +
  JS), THTTPClient bridge cmds (get/put/test), runSyncNow engine with
  pull/merge/push flow, Settings UI, pre-sync backup option. Test
  connection now treats 404 as OK (snapshot not yet created) and 401/
  403 as auth failure with dedicated toast.
- Batch drag-drop: cards + table rows carry checked-set ids (CSV) when
  dragged from an active selection; folder + trash drop handlers parse
  and apply in batch via new moveEntriesToFolder helper that preserves
  TOTP / custom_fields / kind in the full PUT payload.
- Clean shutdown: WM_QUERYENDSESSION / WM_ENDSESSION captured in the
  bridge message-only window; FormCloseQuery bypasses the tray-minimize
  intercept on system shutdown / restart / logoff so FireDAC closes the
  SQLite WAL cleanly instead of leaving -shm / -wal residue after a
  force-kill.
- Center-mode modal: blur+dim backdrop via body::before pseudo-element
  in editor-position=center, swallows clicks below the panel so the
  existing outside-click handlers reliably dismiss the slideover /
  settings panel.
- Batch bar state fixes: state.checked cleared before render in
  moveEntriesToFolder, emptyTrash, and per-card restoreEntry /
  permanentDelete / deleteEntry so the action bar disappears once the
  selection is fully processed.
- Save-then-discard duplicate fix: soState reset to null before
  openSlideOver re-opens the freshly saved entry, otherwise the dirty
  check fired on the soState.id=null → newId switch and a Cancel left
  the form in new-entry mode (second Save → POST duplicate).
- TEST_SYNC.md: end-to-end checklist for validating the WebDAV sync
  with 2 real instances.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-30 00:32:12 +01:00
r-zakarya e23a78dda7 feat: entry templates + tag autocomplete + slideover push + robustness bundle
- Entry templates: new vault_entries.template column drives a typed
  sub-kind ('credit-card', 'ssh-key', 'server', 'recovery-codes'). Card
  + table label off the template, badge reads "credit card" instead of
  "note". Templates seed kind=note (no site/password required), use
  custom_fields with optional dropdown options (brand, month/year,
  protocol). Round-tripped across export/import/duplicate/master-pw
  rotation, preserved by partial PUTs via a HasTemplate flag.
- Custom fields: support per-field `options[]` rendering as <select>
  (card brand, expiry MM/YYYY, SSH/server protocol).
- Tags: existing-tag autocomplete dropdown under the chip input,
  filtered against what's already selected.
- Search history: per-query X for individual delete + 1s debounced
  commit (no Enter required).
- Slideover: clicking outside closes again (drag-selection respected
  via mousedown origin tracker), Esc closes, X closes. App shell is
  pushed left by 420px when the panel is open so the table / pagination
  / sort / search stay visible and interactive.
- Export/import: JSON now round-trips custom_fields, attachments
  (decrypted to base64, re-encrypted under current key on restore),
  icon_b64, and template. CSV warning lists what's not included.
- Auto-backup: same payload shape as user-driven export.
- Notes: import (JSON + CSV) accepts kind=note with empty site,
  preserves title/template/custom_fields. CSV parser detects kind/
  template columns.
- Bulk-import response returns `ids[]` parallel to input so the
  client can map back to new entry IDs (drives attachment restore).
- Move-to-folder bugs fixed: moveEntryToFolder, batchMoveToFolder,
  addTag, batchAddTag were all silently wiping TOTP / custom_fields
  / kind / template via partial PUT. Now re-ship full payload.
- Master-pw rotation: server mints a fresh session token + csrf so
  the very next request after rotation no longer ESessionRejects.
  Client adopts the new pair. Attachments are re-encrypted client-side
  during rotation (GET old → decrypt with old key → encrypt with new
  → PUT). New endpoints: GET /attachments/all, PUT /attachments/:id.
- Duplicate: carries icon_b64 + template + attachments to the copy.
- HandleCreateEntry: accepts icon_b64.
- FireDAC param fix: all blob/icon/custom_fields params use ftMemo +
  .Value assignment so SQLite TEXT no longer truncates to 4000 chars
  (deepseek's 200+ KB favicon was being wiped on lock/unlock).
- HandleSetEntryIcon cap: 262144 → 524288 chars (base64 of a 256 KB
  raw fetch overflows the old cap, fails silently in saveEntryIcon).
- Native save dialog: surfaces server errors instead of swallowing.
- Modals: reauth (export) + backup-password prompt support inline
  error display, retry up to 5 attempts, then hard-stop.
- Keyboard cursor (j/k): bootstraps to current page, auto-paginates
  when the cursor crosses a page boundary, Enter opens slideover.
- Slideover focuses Title on edit-open so j/k → Enter → type Just
  Works.
- TOTP tool: Esc closes the modal.
- App version + launch mode (auto/manual): exposed via bridge,
  surfaced in Settings → Account. Autostart launches suppress the
  first-time tray balloon.
- Passkey button hidden (Delphi backend stubs WebAuthn at 501).
- TEST_PLAN.md captured for regression coverage.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-26 21:20:07 +01:00
Zaki fa7ea191be feat: native save + auto-backup + folder customization + attachments + UX bundle
- File: native Save As dialog via Bridge.saveFile (replaces WebView2
  browser download popup) for encrypted JSON + CSV exports.
- Auto-backup: silent periodic encrypted JSON to a chosen folder,
  user-set interval + retention, separate DPAPI-stored password, runs
  5s after unlock if due. New file/* bridge cmds (folder/pick,
  file/write, file/listMatch, file/delete).
- Folders: per-folder color + icon (8-swatch palette, 8 icon presets),
  drag-reorder via HTML5 DnD with insert-line indicators, edit pencil
  on hover. New POST /folders/reorder + PUT /folders/{name}. Folder
  chip on cards inherits custom icon + color.
- Recently used: vault_entries.accessed_at + POST /entries/{id}/touch
  (debounced 2s), sidebar Tools entry showing top-10 by accessed_at.
- Encrypted attachments: per-entry file storage (5MB cap), AES-GCM
  with vault key, native Save As download, paperclip upload in
  slideover. New entry_attachments table + PM.Handler.Attachments.
- Password expiry: vault_entries.password_changed_at (conditional bump
  via SQL CASE only when ciphertext differs), passwordExpiryDays
  setting, "Aged" badge on cards + matching Filters chip.
- Recovery: Print button on generated code modal (A4 printable sheet
  via @media print, code in 32px monospace + instructions).
- Audit log viewer (sidebar Tools, GET /audit with pagination cursor).
- Plaintext CSV export + Filters dropdown with 9 predicates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-21 23:12:06 +01:00
Zaki 63fac5b3b7 feat: secure notes + password history + custom fields + quick-win bundle
Big feature trio
- Secure notes (kind='login'|'note') reusing the encrypted_password+iv
  pipeline for the body. New sidebar entry, slideover variant (title +
  multiline body), distinct card / table-view rendering, badge in name
  column, copy-content button replacing the password copy on note rows.
- Password history: entries_password_history table keeps up to 20 prior
  ciphertexts per entry. HandleUpdateEntry pushes the pre-update
  encrypted_password into history ONLY when it actually differs from
  the incoming one (JS reuses originalEncrypted bit-for-bit when the
  plaintext is unchanged — avoids spamming history on title/folder edits).
  GET /entries/{id}/history endpoint. Slideover modal lists versions
  with mask/reveal/copy/revert. Master-pw rotation wipes history (old
  ciphertext can't be decrypted with the new key).
- Custom fields: per-entry encrypted JSON array of {label, value,
  is_secret}. Same crypto pipeline as the password. Slideover row UI
  with label/value inputs, secret toggle (eye), copy, delete. Re-
  encryption flows through bulk-import, change-master-password, and
  duplicate.

Quick wins
- Cheatsheet overlay (press '?' or topbar button or Ctrl+K). Lists all
  hotkeys + global / tray / card actions. SVG icons inline so the
  cheatsheet matches the actual app glyphs (no emoji mismatch).
- Open URL button on entry cards: ShellExecute via cmd://app/open-url,
  http(s) only, validates entry.site looks like a real hostname.
- Trash auto-purge: setting "Empty trash after N days" (never/7/30/90).
  DELETE /entries/trash/old?days=N called at every unlock.

Favicon strategy
- Subdomains (chat.deepseek.com, app.X.com…) now try the SLD first
  (deepseek.com.ico) before the full host. DDG often returns a generic
  placeholder for subdomains that passes the byte threshold; the SLD-first
  switch surfaces the real brand icon.
- Cap bumped 64 KB → 256 KB on all three sides (Delphi fetch, server
  endpoint, JS upload). DDG sometimes serves the full-res asset.

UX polish
- Click-outside-slideover: stopPropagation everywhere it bites. Custom
  fields buttons (add / delete / secret toggle / copy / eye) all stop
  the click bubble so the document-level "close on outside click" handler
  doesn't fire when rerender() detaches the target from the DOM.
- Native search-cancel button restyled: cyan accent X via mask-image,
  cursor: pointer, breathing room before the Ctrl+K kbd chip.
- Password history modal: scrollable body, multiline wrapped passwords,
  hover border highlight.
- Cheatsheet panel widened (560 → 720 px) so the descriptions no longer
  ellipsis-clip.
- "+ New" topbar splits into a small dropdown: New login / New note.
- Notes show a "note" badge in table-view name column, italic
  "Encrypted note" placeholder in the username column.

Internals
- duplicateEntry copies kind + custom_fields too (one-line forgotten
  earlier).
- entries_password_history dropped on master-pw rotation — the old
  ciphertexts are unrecoverable with the new key.
- bulk-import re-encryption path includes custom_fields.

CLAUDE.md
- "Entry payload — call sites à toucher ensemble" lists the 6 spots
  to update when adding a new (en)crypted field. Notes the historical
  miss of kind in duplicateEntry and custom_fields in the rotation +
  duplicate.

Repo hygiene
- .gitattributes forces CRLF on Delphi sources (RAD Studio refuses LF).
  text=auto for web frontend / docs, binary for .res / .exe / images.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-14 20:17:19 +01:00
Zaki ad5fb21a18 feat: website favicons + vault health dashboard
Favicons
- PM.Favicon (new): THTTPClient/WinHTTP proxy to icons.duckduckgo.com.
  Native Windows TLS — no OpenSSL DLLs to ship (Indy would fail
  silently without them). 5 s timeout, max 3 redirects, 64 KB cap,
  magic-byte MIME sniffing.
- DB: vault_entries.icon_b64 TEXT (idempotent migration).
- Endpoints: POST /entries/{id}/icon stores a cached data URI without
  forcing a full PUT (which would re-encrypt the password). DELETE
  /entries/icons/all purges the cache.
- Bridge cmd://favicon/fetch?host=X&reqId=Y runs in an anonymous thread
  so the up-to-5 s HTTP GET doesn't block the main thread; result
  shipped back via Bridge.onFaviconResult(reqId, host, dataUri).
- Hostname validated on both sides (JS faviconHost + Delphi
  NormalizeHost) so brand labels like "Gitea" never leak upstream.
- Settings: opt-in "Fetch website icons" toggle (synced), three explicit
  actions (Fetch missing / Re-fetch all / Clear cache) that bypass the
  toggle — manual user actions always work.
- Entry card avatar shows <img> when cached, falls back to initials.
  onerror handler recovers silently from a corrupt data URI.

Vault health
- New sidebar Tools → "Vault health" view. Four category cards:
  Weak (strength < 50), Reused (same plaintext on ≥ 2 entries), Old
  (updated_at > 365d), Pwned (HIBP cache).
- Score 0-100 with colour band (Good/Fair/At risk/Critical).
- One-shot computation cached per session (healthCache), invalidated
  on lockVault, entry save, and the explicit "Recompute" button.
- "Fix" button on each item opens the slideover for the affected
  entry, unmasks the password, focuses it, and pulses the dice button
  — full context preserved, user decides how to fix.
- Click handler stopPropagation prevents the document-level
  "click outside slideover" listener from closing the panel that
  we just opened in the same click event.

Fixes
- openSlideover typo (lowercase O) → openSlideOver across all call
  sites. Was silently breaking the Authenticator card click and the
  Vault health Fix button.
- W1050 WideChar warning in PM.Favicon — replaced set-membership
  with explicit Ord-style range comparisons.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-09 00:05:54 +01:00
Zaki 40b3154a34 feat: MFA tools, single-instance, tray polish, prefs persistence
Session highlights:

- feat(prefs): DPAPI-backed key/value store (PM.UserPrefs) — fixes
  rememberedUsername being lost across reboots due to the random
  ephemeral HTTP port changing the localStorage origin every launch.
  Bridge cmd://prefs/{get,set} round-trips through Delphi.

- feat(tray): icon visible from startup (NIM_ADD at constructor, not
  at first minimize). Tray context menu themed via uxtheme!135
  SetPreferredAppMode so it follows the app's dark/light setting.

- feat(single-instance): named mutex + RegisterWindowMessage broadcast.
  Second launch posts WM_PMSHOW to HWND_BROADCAST and exits; the
  running bridge restores the window from tray. Mutex lives in Local\
  namespace so distinct Windows users can still each run one.

- feat(mfa): Authenticator sidebar view (live TOTP codes for every
  entry with a secret) + standalone TOTP generator modal (paste
  base32 / otpauth:// URI, or generate a random 20-byte secret).

- feat(sidebar): Folders / Tags / Tools sections collapsible with
  chevron toggle. Badge counts stay visible when collapsed. State
  persisted in settings_json (synced across devices).

- feat(autofill): hotkey when vault is locked now restores the app
  and focuses the master password input instead of no-op'ing
  silently. Cleaner UX for the common "I hit Ctrl+Shift+L but the
  vault was locked" path.

- feat(quick-unlock): when enabled, skip lockVault on Windows lock /
  sleep. Rationale: the DPAPI blob already gates access via the
  Windows account, so re-locking on top of the OS lock is redundant.
  Idle auto-lock still fires (separate opt-in).

- fix(quick-unlock): re-sync state.quickUnlockEnabled from DPAPI
  source-of-truth at boot, instead of trusting (now-volatile)
  localStorage.

- docs: CLAUDE.md updated with all new modules, bridge commands,
  and the port-ephemeral pitfall.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-08 21:31:39 +01:00
Zaki 01c56edf25 feat(recovery): single-use recovery code for forgotten master password
In a zero-knowledge vault, forgetting the master password normally
means losing the data — the AES key is derived from the master pw
and the server can't help. This commit adds the standard escape
hatch: a one-time recovery code that key-wraps the AES key so the
user can get back in.

Threat model
============
The plaintext recovery code is shown to the user exactly once, at
generation time. Server only ever stores SHA-256(code) + an AES-GCM
wrap of the vault key under a KEK = PBKDF2(code, kdf_salt, 600k).
Without the plaintext code the server cannot unwrap. The code is
high-entropy (96 bits from a 32-char ambiguity-free alphabet, in 4
groups of 4) — printed form is misreading-resistant.

Single use: redeeming deletes the row inside the same DB.Lock the
lookup happened in, so concurrent redeem attempts are race-free.
Failed redemptions feed both the per-IP rate limit AND the per-
username lockout, so brute-forcing the code is infeasible.

Schema
======
recovery_keys (
  user_id      INTEGER PRIMARY KEY (1:1 with users, FK cascade),
  code_hash    TEXT NOT NULL          (SHA-256 hex of plaintext code),
  kdf_salt     TEXT NOT NULL          (PBKDF2 salt for KEK derivation),
  wrapped_key  TEXT NOT NULL          (base64 AES-GCM ciphertext of vault key),
  wrapped_iv   TEXT NOT NULL          (base64 12B IV for the wrap),
  created_at   DATETIME DEFAULT CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
)

Backend: new unit PM.Handler.Recovery
=====================================
  GET    /recovery-key/status   (auth)         -> { configured, created_at? }
  POST   /recovery-key/setup    (auth + CSRF)  body {masterPassword, codeHash,
                                                     kdfSalt, wrappedKey, wrappedIv}
  DELETE /recovery-key          (auth + CSRF)  -> remove config
  POST   /recovery-key/redeem   (NO auth)      body {username, code}
                                               -> session + wrappedKey + wrappedIv + kdfSalt
                                                  + user's current salt + kdfIterations

VerifyMasterPassword() helper handles both legacy 'pbkdf2' and
current 'pbkdf2-sha256' schemes consistently with PM.Handler.Auth.

Setup flow
==========
1. Settings → "Generate recovery code" button (asks master pw via reauth).
2. Client generates: 16-char code + fresh kdf_salt + exports the current
   AES key via crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw').
3. Client wraps the raw key under KEK=PBKDF2(code, kdf_salt, 600k)
   with a random 12B IV → base64.
4. POSTs to /recovery-key/setup. Server verifies master pw, INSERT-or-
   replaces the row (DELETE+INSERT, no UPSERT — same pattern as the
   lockout table since FireDAC's UPSERT support is patchy).
5. Confirm modal shows the plaintext code in a monospace, user-select-all
   panel. The modal is forcing: "I saved it" button is the only way out.
   Modal is the only place the code ever appears — server never sees it.

Redeem flow (forgot master pw)
==============================
1. Auth screen → "Forgot master password? Use a recovery code" link.
2. promptDialog: username, then code (masked input).
3. POST /recovery-key/redeem. Server hashes the typed code, joins with
   users by username, ConstantTimeEquals against stored hash. On match:
     - deletes the recovery_keys row (single-use)
     - issues a fresh session token + CSRF
     - returns: { token, csrfToken, salt, kdfIterations, kdfSalt,
                  wrappedKey, wrappedIv, userId }
4. Client unwraps the AES key with PBKDF2(code, kdfSalt, 600k) → raw bytes
   → importKey('raw') back into a CryptoKey.
5. State is reconstituted from the new session, persistCryptoKey, enterApp.
6. Client immediately opens the Change-master-password modal — the
   recovery code is consumed and the account needs a fresh master pw
   AND a fresh recovery code (the user generates a new one from Settings).

Backward compat
===============
Recovery is opt-in. Existing users see "No recovery key set" in Settings
until they generate one. No migration needed — the table is created via
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS at server startup, FK cascade on user delete.

Minor UI additions
==================
 - .btn-link CSS class for the auth-screen "Forgot master password?" link.
 - Recovery-status label in Settings refreshed on every openSettings()
   via GET /recovery-key/status.
2026-05-23 11:18:34 +01:00
Zaki cf94f67488 feat(2fa): TOTP secret storage + live 6-digit code generation
Adds RFC 6238 TOTP (Google Authenticator-style) support to every entry.
The secret is encrypted client-side with the same AES-GCM key as the
password — the server stores opaque ciphertext and never sees the
plaintext base32 secret.

Schema
======
vault_entries.totp_secret TEXT  -- AES-GCM ciphertext, base64
vault_entries.totp_iv     TEXT  -- 12-byte IV, base64
Both NULL when the entry has no 2FA configured. Added via
ApplyMigrations.AddColumnIfMissing so existing vaults migrate cleanly.

Backend
=======
HandleListEntries: includes totp_secret + totp_iv in the response (or
JSON null when not configured).
HandleCreateEntry / HandleUpdateEntry: accept both fields; empty string
in the body → server stores NULL. Clearing the secret removes 2FA
from the entry.

Frontend
========
TOTP primitives (pure crypto.subtle, no external lib):
 - base32Decode(s)         — RFC 4648, tolerates spaces / lowercase
 - generateTOTP(secret)    — HMAC-SHA1 + RFC 4226 dynamic truncation
 - parseOtpAuthUri(raw)    — extracts ?secret from otpauth:// URIs

UI in the slide-over (the canonical entry detail view):
 - New "Two-factor (TOTP)" field below the password row.
 - Input is password-masked by default with eye-toggle to reveal.
 - Pasting a full otpauth:// URI auto-extracts the secret param so the
   user can copy directly from a QR-code scanner without manual cleanup.
 - X button clears the secret (= removes 2FA on next save).
 - Live code panel below: large monospace "123 456" + Copy button
   (routes through Bridge.copySecure → secure clipboard + 30s auto-clear).
 - Linear progress bar drains over the 30s window, turns red < 5s.
 - Refresh tick runs once per second while the slide-over is open;
   stops on closeSlideOver to avoid background work.

Entry card meta now shows a "2FA" chip when totp_secret is non-null —
quick visual scan for which accounts have 2FA configured without
opening the slide-over.

Validation
==========
soSave calls base32Decode(secret) before encrypting to refuse obviously
broken input. Otherwise garbled base32 would save fine and only fail
in the code panel next time.

Migration interaction (KDF 100k→600k)
=====================================
KNOWN MINOR ISSUE: /migrate-kdf only re-encrypts encrypted_password+iv,
not totp_secret+totp_iv. In practice this is harmless because:
  1) KDF migration runs immediately after login on legacy accounts —
     before the user has a chance to add a TOTP secret.
  2) New accounts start at 600k iterations, no migration ever needed.
A legacy user who somehow added a TOTP between login and the
background migration completing would end up with a TOTP encrypted
under the old key. The fix (extend /migrate-kdf to re-encrypt TOTP
fields too) is a one-line follow-up if anyone hits the edge case.
2026-05-23 05:13:50 +01:00
Zaki e0e452306e feat(crypto): PBKDF2 iterations 100k → 600k with transparent re-encryption
Bumps the PBKDF2-SHA256 iteration count from 100,000 (OWASP 2017) to
600,000 (OWASP 2023). 6x slowdown on every brute-force attempt against
either the server-stored auth hash OR the AES-GCM ciphertext of the
entries — both currently use the same PBKDF2 output (see KNOWN ISSUE
below for why that's another problem to fix later).

Schema
======
users.kdf_iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 100000
  Per-user iteration count. Legacy rows predating the column default
  to 100k via the DEFAULT clause. New accounts insert 600k explicitly.

Migration flow
==============
Atomic from the user's perspective. No partial state ever persisted.

  1. /login (or /reauth):
     server reads users.kdf_iterations and verifies the master pw at
     that count. Login succeeds at the legacy strength. Response now
     includes kdfIterations (current) and optionally kdfMigration =
     { target: 600000 } when an upgrade is recommended.

  2. Client:
     derives the AES key at the OLD count to decrypt current entries
     (state.cryptoKey). enterApp() loads the vault normally.

  3. runKdfMigration() (background, after enterApp):
     - derives the NEW key at target iterations
     - decrypts every entry with the old key
     - re-encrypts every entry with the new key + fresh random IVs
     - POSTs { masterPassword, entries: [...] } to /migrate-kdf

  4. /migrate-kdf (new endpoint):
     - verifies the master pw against the OLD hash
     - in a single transaction:
        UPDATE users  SET password_hash = pbkdf2(pw, salt, 600k),
                          kdf_iterations = 600000
        UPDATE vault_entries SET encrypted_password, iv (per entry)
     - on any failure: ROLLBACK. User stays at legacy config, retries
       at next login. No half-migrated state possible.

  5. Client (post-commit):
     swaps state.cryptoKey to the new key, persists it, updates the
     cached ciphertext in state.entries, shows a "Vault security
     upgraded" toast.

Idempotency: server's /migrate-kdf short-circuits with "Already at
target" if users.kdf_iterations >= PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET.

Race conditions: two concurrent migrations from two tabs both
recompute the SAME new key (deterministic PBKDF2). The losing
transaction's entries get re-encrypted with the winning one's IVs,
but both clients can decrypt because the keys are identical.

KNOWN ISSUE (not fixed by this commit)
======================================
The server's password_hash IS the client's AES key, in hex form —
both sides compute PBKDF2(pw, salt, iters) and store/use the same
32 bytes. This means a stolen vault.db gives the attacker the
encryption key directly, without needing to brute-force anything.
The 100k → 600k bump still helps because the AES-GCM ciphertext
itself is also a brute-force target, but the architectural fix
(server stores SHA256(aes_key) instead of aes_key in hex) is a
separate concern that needs its own migration.

Other changes
=============
 - HandleRegister: new accounts insert kdf_iterations=600000.
 - HandleReauth: response upgraded to JSON with kdfIterations
   + optional kdfMigration. Unlock path now also triggers migration.
 - SendAuthSuccess: extended signature, all callers updated.
 - deriveKey(pwd, saltHex, iterations) in app.js: iterations param
   required, defaults to 100000 for back-compat with any legacy caller.
2026-05-23 04:54:05 +01:00
Zaki 9f6636defc feat(auth): per-account brute-force lockout with exponential backoff
Existing protection was per-IP only (login_attempts table). On a loopback
deployment everyone hits 127.0.0.1, so the per-IP counter is mostly
ornamental — the real attacker is on the same machine. Adds a second
defense layer that tracks failures per username with an exponential
backoff schedule.

Schema:
  account_lockouts (username TEXT PK, failed_count INT,
                    locked_until DATETIME, last_attempt_at, last_attempt_ip)

Backoff after threshold (4+ failures):
  1, 2, 3 failures → no lockout (grace window for typos)
  4th             → 60 s
  5th             → 5 min
  6th             → 15 min
  7th             → 1 h
  8th             → 6 h
  9th and beyond  → 24 h (capped)

Counter resets to 0 on successful login or reauth. Old non-locked rows
older than 30 days are pruned by CleanupExpired alongside the existing
sessions / audit_log / login_attempts cleanups.

Wiring:
 - HandleLogin / HandleReauth both check RejectIfAccountLocked() before
   touching the users table. Lockout responses are 429 with JSON body
   { error, retry_after } and a Retry-After header.
 - Failed attempts are recorded against the username even when the user
   doesn't exist, preventing account enumeration via differential
   "is this account locked?" probes.
 - PBKDF2 hash comparison was already constant-time (ConstantTimeEquals);
   no change there.

Client (js/app.js):
 - api() now preserves response status + body on Error so callers can
   distinguish 429-lockout from other errors.
 - New showLockoutCountdown(seconds) renders a live "Account locked —
   try again in Xm Ys" message in #authHint, disables #loginBtn until
   the countdown reaches 0, then re-enables it.
 - doLogin / doUnlock both branch on err.status === 429 + retry_after
   to call showLockoutCountdown instead of a generic error toast.

Known limitation: an attacker can DoS-lock arbitrary usernames by
spamming /login with that name. This is intentional — the alternative
(per-(username,IP) tracking) would let attackers enumerate accounts.
DoS-lock is acceptable; auth bypass is not.
2026-05-23 00:14:44 +01:00
Zaki 506aee7e6f feat: Delphi backend + JS↔Delphi bridge (clipboard, tray, auto-lock)
Introduces the Delphi 12 FMX backend (PMServer) that hosts the embedded
WebView2 vault on 127.0.0.1, and a native bridge between JS and Delphi
that wires three privacy-focused features:

1. Secure clipboard
   Copying a password registers the Win32 "ExcludeClipboardContentFromMonitorProcessing"
   format alongside CF_UNICODETEXT, so Win+V clipboard history never sees
   the value. Auto-clears after 30s via TTimer. Bridge.copySecure() in
   app.js routes all password/username/secret copy paths through the
   native layer when running inside the Delphi WebView2 (falls back to
   navigator.clipboard for the PHP standalone).

2. Tray icon (X-to-tray when server running)
   Closing the dev panel hides both the form HWND and the TFMAppClass
   per-process proxy window that owns the FMX taskbar entry — the form's
   HWND alone is not the taskbar-visible one in FMX (took some iteration
   to discover). Tray menu: Open, Lock vault, Quit. Clipboard is force-
   cleared on minimize as extra safety. First-time minimize fires a
   balloon notification so the user knows the app is still running.

3. Auto-lock on Windows session lock (Win+L)
   wtsapi32.dll!WTSRegisterSessionNotification on a dedicated message-only
   window. On WM_WTSSESSION_CHANGE / WTS_SESSION_LOCK, the bridge calls
   ExecuteJavaScript('lockVault()'). Same path used by the tray "Lock vault"
   menu item.

Bridge architecture:
 - JS → Delphi via cmd:// URLs intercepted in OnBeforeNavigate
   (pattern lifted from DeskInsight Monaco). Currently exposes
   cmd://clipboard/copy?text=...&clear=... and cmd://clipboard/clear.
 - Delphi → JS via TTMSFNCWebBrowser.ExecuteJavaScript with guarded
   calls (typeof check) so the bridge degrades cleanly if app.js isn't
   loaded yet.

Files:
 - Source/PM.Bridge.pas (new) — TSecureClipboard + TPMBridge
 - UMainForm.pas/.fmx — bridge wiring, FormCloseQuery intercept, tray
   callbacks (BridgeTrayRestore / BridgeLockRequest / BridgeQuit)
 - js/app.js — Bridge object, 5 navigator.clipboard sites migrated to
   Bridge.copySecure with PHP-compatible fallback, Bridge.onTrayRestore
   handler that resets the auto-lock timer

.gitignore extended with Delphi build artifacts (*.dcu, Win32/, Win64/,
__history/, __recovery/, *.identcache, *.dsk, *.local, etc.) so source
checkouts stay clean.
2026-05-22 23:47:57 +01:00