Generating a recovery code POSTed /recovery-key/setup — which deletes any
existing recovery row and inserts the new one — BEFORE showing the code. So
cancelling the "save this code" modal still erased the old code and activated
a new one the user never saw: a silent path to lockout.
Generate + wrap locally, show the code, and only POST setup after "I saved
it". Cancel now writes nothing — the account is left exactly as it was, old
code still valid.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Setting a PIN, enabling Quick Unlock, and generating a recovery key all
closed the reauth modal and showed a toast on the first wrong master
password — no retry. Export already looped inline; the others didn't.
Extracted that loop into reauthLoop(message): re-prompts with an inline
error + attempt count (5 tries), honours the 429 lockout, returns the
verified password or null. All four sensitive-action flows now share it, so
a mistyped master password keeps the modal up to try again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A memory dump of the WebView2 renderer (vault unlocked) showed the AES vault
key sitting in sessionStorage as a clean base64 string — a plaintext copy of
the master secret, trivially grep-able, present the whole session.
persistCryptoKey/restoreCryptoKey existed only to survive a page reload, but
the shell has no reload path (F5/Ctrl+R blocked, every navigation is a cmd://
bridge call), so the branch that consumed it was unreachable. Removed both
functions, their 7 call sites, and collapsed the init restore branch into the
plain cold-start path (Quick Unlock → PIN → master-pw, all already there).
Also scrub the derived key bytes from the heap (keyBytes.fill(0)) once the
CryptoKey and verifier are built — the CryptoKey keeps its own copy.
Not fixable here, documented: the key stays extractable:true (Quick Unlock,
PIN, recovery and master-pw change all exportKey it), and decrypted password
strings still linger in the V8/Blink heap after lock — immutable strings the
GC never zeroes, inherent to a JS/WebView2 password manager.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "clears in 30s" suffix was hardcoded in ~14 toasts. Single helper
clipClearSuffix() reads clipboardClearSeconds (''=Never); prefixes concatenated
to it. Cheatsheet text made generic "(auto-clears)".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
app.js 9363 -> 7962 lines. Three new classic-script modules:
- app.attachments.js (250): blob crypto + upload/download UI, pure
declarations, loads before app.js
- app.autofill.js (276): Win32 combos, title->entry matching, picker,
pure declarations, loads before app.js
- app.unlock.js (907): Quick Unlock + PIN + recovery code grouped (same
"enter without master pw" theme); assigns Bridge.onPinResult /
onQuickUnlockResult at top level so it loads AFTER app.js, like app.sync.js
Audit viewer stays in app.js (only 65 lines, not worth a file). Clipboard
bridge helpers stay too (were interleaved in the quick-unlock section but
unrelated). Registered in BuildAssets whitelist + index.html + APP_PARTS.
Verified in-app: quick unlock cold-start, attachment upload/download.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
r-zakarya