9f6636defc
Existing protection was per-IP only (login_attempts table). On a loopback
deployment everyone hits 127.0.0.1, so the per-IP counter is mostly
ornamental — the real attacker is on the same machine. Adds a second
defense layer that tracks failures per username with an exponential
backoff schedule.
Schema:
account_lockouts (username TEXT PK, failed_count INT,
locked_until DATETIME, last_attempt_at, last_attempt_ip)
Backoff after threshold (4+ failures):
1, 2, 3 failures → no lockout (grace window for typos)
4th → 60 s
5th → 5 min
6th → 15 min
7th → 1 h
8th → 6 h
9th and beyond → 24 h (capped)
Counter resets to 0 on successful login or reauth. Old non-locked rows
older than 30 days are pruned by CleanupExpired alongside the existing
sessions / audit_log / login_attempts cleanups.
Wiring:
- HandleLogin / HandleReauth both check RejectIfAccountLocked() before
touching the users table. Lockout responses are 429 with JSON body
{ error, retry_after } and a Retry-After header.
- Failed attempts are recorded against the username even when the user
doesn't exist, preventing account enumeration via differential
"is this account locked?" probes.
- PBKDF2 hash comparison was already constant-time (ConstantTimeEquals);
no change there.
Client (js/app.js):
- api() now preserves response status + body on Error so callers can
distinguish 429-lockout from other errors.
- New showLockoutCountdown(seconds) renders a live "Account locked —
try again in Xm Ys" message in #authHint, disables #loginBtn until
the countdown reaches 0, then re-enables it.
- doLogin / doUnlock both branch on err.status === 429 + retry_after
to call showLockoutCountdown instead of a generic error toast.
Known limitation: an attacker can DoS-lock arbitrary usernames by
spamming /login with that name. This is intentional — the alternative
(per-(username,IP) tracking) would let attackers enumerate accounts.
DoS-lock is acceptable; auth bypass is not.
308 lines
9.1 KiB
ObjectPascal
308 lines
9.1 KiB
ObjectPascal
unit PM.RateLimit;
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{
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Two-layer brute-force protection:
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1) Per-IP rate limit (login_attempts table, 15-minute window).
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Useful for non-loopback deployments and as a defense-in-depth layer.
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2) Per-username lockout (account_lockouts table, exponential backoff).
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The real defense for a loopback-only setup where everyone shares
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127.0.0.1. After 4 consecutive failed attempts for a given username,
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the account is locked for an increasing duration (1m, 5m, 15m, 1h,
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6h, 24h-capped). Counter resets on successful authentication.
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IMPORTANT: failed attempts are recorded even when the username doesn't
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exist in the users table. This prevents attackers from enumerating
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existing accounts by observing which usernames trigger a lockout.
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Trade-off: an attacker can DoS-lock arbitrary usernames, but they can
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never bypass authentication this way.
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}
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interface
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uses
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System.SysUtils, System.JSON,
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FireDAC.Comp.Client, FireDAC.Stan.Param, IdCustomHTTPServer,
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PM.Database;
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function GetClientIP(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo): string;
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// ---- Per-IP rate limit (legacy) ----
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function CheckRateLimit(const AIP: string): Integer;
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procedure RecordAttempt(const AIP: string);
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procedure ClearAttempts(const AIP: string);
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// ---- Per-username account lockout ----
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// Seconds remaining until the account is unlocked. 0 means not locked.
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function GetAccountLockoutRemaining(const AUsername: string): Integer;
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// Records a failed authentication attempt against AUsername (whether or not
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// the user exists), applies exponential backoff, and returns the new
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// failed_count. Caller should pass this back to the audit log.
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function RecordFailedAccountAttempt(const AUsername, AIP: string): Integer;
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// Resets the failed counter and clears any lockout for AUsername. Call on
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// successful login / reauth.
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procedure ClearAccountLockout(const AUsername: string);
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// One-stop helper for handlers: if the account is currently locked, sends
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// a 429 with a JSON body { error, retry_after } and returns True. Caller
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// should Exit immediately. Returns False if not locked (caller proceeds).
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function RejectIfAccountLocked(AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo;
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const AUsername: string): Boolean;
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implementation
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function GetClientIP(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo): string;
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begin
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// api.php trusts X-Forwarded-For (security flaw H1 in audit). Since this
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// server is loopback-only and not behind a proxy, prefer the actual peer IP.
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Result := ARequest.RemoteIP;
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if Result = '' then Result := 'unknown';
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end;
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function CheckRateLimit(const AIP: string): Integer;
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var
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LQ: TFDQuery;
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begin
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Result := 0;
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DB.Lock;
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try
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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LQ.SQL.Text :=
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'SELECT COUNT(*) AS cnt FROM login_attempts ' +
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'WHERE ip = :ip ' +
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'AND attempted_at > datetime(''now'', ''-15 minutes'')';
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LQ.ParamByName('ip').AsString := AIP;
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LQ.Open;
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Result := LQ.FieldByName('cnt').AsInteger;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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finally
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DB.Unlock;
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end;
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end;
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procedure RecordAttempt(const AIP: string);
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var
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LQ: TFDQuery;
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begin
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DB.Lock;
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try
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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LQ.SQL.Text := 'INSERT INTO login_attempts (ip) VALUES (:ip)';
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LQ.ParamByName('ip').AsString := AIP;
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LQ.ExecSQL;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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finally
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DB.Unlock;
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end;
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end;
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procedure ClearAttempts(const AIP: string);
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var
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LQ: TFDQuery;
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begin
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DB.Lock;
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try
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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LQ.SQL.Text := 'DELETE FROM login_attempts WHERE ip = :ip';
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LQ.ParamByName('ip').AsString := AIP;
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LQ.ExecSQL;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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finally
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DB.Unlock;
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end;
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end;
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// =============================================================================
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// Per-username lockout with exponential backoff
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// =============================================================================
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// Exponential backoff schedule. Index = failed_count value AFTER this attempt.
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// First 3 failures give no lockout — a real user typing their master pw
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// wrong once or twice shouldn't be punished. From the 4th failure on, the
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// duration ramps up sharply. Capped at 24 h regardless of further failures.
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function ComputeBackoffSeconds(AFailedCount: Integer): Integer;
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begin
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case AFailedCount of
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0..3: Result := 0; // grace window
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4: Result := 60; // 1 minute
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5: Result := 300; // 5 minutes
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6: Result := 900; // 15 minutes
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7: Result := 3600; // 1 hour
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8: Result := 21600; // 6 hours
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else
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Result := 86400; // 24 hours — capped, regardless of count
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end;
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end;
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function GetAccountLockoutRemaining(const AUsername: string): Integer;
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var
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LQ: TFDQuery;
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begin
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Result := 0;
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if AUsername = '' then Exit;
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DB.Lock;
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try
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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// CAST(strftime(...) - strftime(...) AS INTEGER) gives seconds remaining.
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// If locked_until is NULL or in the past, the SELECT returns 0.
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LQ.SQL.Text :=
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'SELECT MAX(0, CAST(' +
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' (strftime(''%s'', locked_until) - strftime(''%s'', ''now''))' +
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' AS INTEGER)) AS remaining ' +
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'FROM account_lockouts WHERE username = :u';
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LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := AUsername;
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LQ.Open;
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if not LQ.IsEmpty then
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Result := LQ.FieldByName('remaining').AsInteger;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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finally
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DB.Unlock;
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end;
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end;
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function RecordFailedAccountAttempt(const AUsername, AIP: string): Integer;
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var
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LQ: TFDQuery;
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LNewCount, LBackoff: Integer;
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begin
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Result := 0;
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if AUsername = '' then Exit;
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DB.Lock;
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try
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// Step 1: upsert + increment in a single statement. SQLite's
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// ON CONFLICT(...) DO UPDATE handles the "row already exists" case
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// atomically without a separate SELECT/UPDATE race.
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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LQ.SQL.Text :=
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'INSERT INTO account_lockouts ' +
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' (username, failed_count, last_attempt_at, last_attempt_ip) ' +
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'VALUES (:u, 1, CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, :ip) ' +
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'ON CONFLICT(username) DO UPDATE SET ' +
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' failed_count = failed_count + 1, ' +
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' last_attempt_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP, ' +
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' last_attempt_ip = excluded.last_attempt_ip';
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LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := AUsername;
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LQ.ParamByName('ip').AsString := AIP;
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LQ.ExecSQL;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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// Step 2: read the new failed_count and apply backoff if the threshold
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// is crossed. Done in two queries because SQLite's RETURNING clause
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// requires 3.35+ and we want to support older versions.
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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LQ.SQL.Text :=
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'SELECT failed_count FROM account_lockouts WHERE username = :u';
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LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := AUsername;
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LQ.Open;
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if LQ.IsEmpty then Exit;
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LNewCount := LQ.FieldByName('failed_count').AsInteger;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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Result := LNewCount;
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LBackoff := ComputeBackoffSeconds(LNewCount);
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if LBackoff > 0 then
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begin
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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LQ.SQL.Text :=
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'UPDATE account_lockouts SET ' +
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' locked_until = datetime(''now'', ''+'' || :sec || '' seconds'') ' +
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'WHERE username = :u';
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LQ.ParamByName('sec').AsInteger := LBackoff;
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LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := AUsername;
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LQ.ExecSQL;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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end;
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finally
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DB.Unlock;
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end;
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end;
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procedure ClearAccountLockout(const AUsername: string);
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var
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LQ: TFDQuery;
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begin
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if AUsername = '' then Exit;
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DB.Lock;
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try
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LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
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try
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LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
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// Hard delete on success: keeps the table small, and there's no
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// value in remembering past failures once the user has proven they
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// know the password.
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LQ.SQL.Text := 'DELETE FROM account_lockouts WHERE username = :u';
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LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := AUsername;
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LQ.ExecSQL;
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finally
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LQ.Free;
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end;
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finally
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DB.Unlock;
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end;
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end;
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function RejectIfAccountLocked(AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo;
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const AUsername: string): Boolean;
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var
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LRemaining: Integer;
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LBody: TJSONObject;
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begin
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LRemaining := GetAccountLockoutRemaining(AUsername);
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Result := LRemaining > 0;
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if not Result then Exit;
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// 429 Too Many Requests with a structured body so the client can show
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// a countdown timer ("Try again in X seconds") instead of a generic
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// error toast. Standard Retry-After header included as a fallback for
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// HTTP-aware tooling.
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AResponse.ResponseNo := 429;
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AResponse.ContentType := 'application/json; charset=utf-8';
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Retry-After'] := IntToStr(LRemaining);
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LBody := TJSONObject.Create;
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try
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LBody.AddPair('error', 'Account temporarily locked due to repeated failed attempts');
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LBody.AddPair('retry_after', TJSONNumber.Create(LRemaining));
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AResponse.ContentText := LBody.ToJSON;
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finally
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LBody.Free;
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end;
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end;
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end.
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