/recovery-key/setup verified the master password with a local copy of the
verifier check that only knew pbkdf2 (legacy) and pbkdf2-sha256. Any account
on a decoupled scheme — pbkdf2-sha256-v2 or argon2id-v2, the current default
after a master-pw rotation — fell through both branches and was rejected as
"invalid password" even when correct, so recovery-key setup was impossible.
Match the canonical VerifierToStoredHash (PM.Handler.Auth): legacy stores the
verifier raw, every other algo is SHA256-wrapped identically. One branch, plus
a keep-in-sync note so the copy doesn't drift again.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
r-zakarya
665d8ea4e6
