a45897c33d
HIBP integration ================ Opt-in (default OFF) password breach check via the Have I Been Pwned range API. The full master / entry password never leaves the machine — only the first 5 characters of its SHA-1 hash. HIBP returns ~500 candidate suffixes; the client matches its own suffix locally. UI: - New "Check passwords against breach database (HIBP)" toggle in Settings → Security with an explainer hint about k-anonymity. - On enable: background batch scan of all entries, results cached in state.hibpResults keyed by entry id. Concurrency capped at 6 to avoid hammering HIBP / hitting browser connection limits. - Entry cards show a red "Pwned" chip + breach count in the tooltip when count > 0. New i-alert icon added to the SVG sprite. - Auto-scan triggered after every enterApp() when the toggle is on. Functions added to app.js: - sha1Hex(text) — crypto.subtle wrapper - hibpCheckPassword(plaintext) — single-password check, returns count - hibpCheckAllEntries() — batched scan over state.entries The "Add-Padding: true" header is sent on every range request to defeat the response-size side-channel (HIBP adds 800-1000 random extra entries so an observer counting bytes can't narrow the prefix queried). CSP tightening ============== Audited the served HTML: zero <script> tags inline, only the external js/app.js. Removed 'unsafe-inline' from script-src — real XSS defense. Kept 'unsafe-inline' on style-src for now because index.html contains inline style="" attributes and app.js calls element.style.cssText extensively. Refactoring to CSS classes is a separate cleanup. Style injection alone cannot execute code, so the residual risk is bounded to visual manipulation in a single-user loopback app. Added api.pwnedpasswords.com to connect-src as the only allowed external origin (required by the HIBP feature above). Default still 'self' — everything else stays loopback. Before: script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self'; After: script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; connect-src 'self' https://api.pwnedpasswords.com;
223 lines
7.6 KiB
ObjectPascal
223 lines
7.6 KiB
ObjectPascal
unit PM.HTTPServer;
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{
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Indy TIdHTTPServer wrapper.
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- Binds 127.0.0.1 ONLY (hardcoded — never expose on LAN)
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- Sets security headers (CSP, HSTS, CORS localhost)
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- Handles OPTIONS preflight
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- Dispatches to PM.Router; 404 if no match
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}
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interface
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uses
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System.SysUtils, System.Classes, System.IOUtils,
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IdHTTPServer, IdContext, IdCustomHTTPServer, IdSocketHandle,
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PM.Router, PM.JSON, PM.Database, PM.StaticFiles, PM.EmbeddedAssets;
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type
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TLogProc = reference to procedure(const AMsg: string);
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TPMHTTPServer = class
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private
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FServer: TIdHTTPServer;
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FOnLog: TLogProc;
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procedure HandleCommand(AContext: TIdContext;
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ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo; AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo);
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procedure HandleCommandOther(AContext: TIdContext;
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ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo; AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo);
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procedure HandleParseAuthentication(AContext: TIdContext;
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const AAuthType, AAuthData: string;
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var VUsername, VPassword: string; var VHandled: Boolean);
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procedure HandleException(AContext: TIdContext; AException: Exception);
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procedure ApplySecurityHeaders(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo;
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AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo);
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procedure Log(const AMsg: string);
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function GetActive: Boolean;
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public
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constructor Create;
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destructor Destroy; override;
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procedure Start(APort: Integer);
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procedure Stop;
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property Active: Boolean read GetActive;
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property OnLog: TLogProc read FOnLog write FOnLog;
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end;
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implementation
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constructor TPMHTTPServer.Create;
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begin
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inherited;
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FServer := TIdHTTPServer.Create(nil);
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FServer.OnCommandGet := HandleCommand;
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FServer.OnCommandOther := HandleCommandOther;
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// Tell Indy NOT to raise EIdHTTPUnsupportedAuthorisationScheme on 'Bearer'.
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// We parse the Authorization header ourselves in PM.Session.
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FServer.OnParseAuthentication := HandleParseAuthentication;
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// Swallow harmless socket disconnect exceptions (10053 / 10054) — Edge
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// Chromium pre-fetches and cancels connections, which is normal but noisy
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// under the debugger.
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FServer.OnException := HandleException;
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.HandleException(AContext: TIdContext;
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AException: Exception);
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begin
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// EIdSocketError with 10053/10054 = client aborted, expected. Log everything
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// else.
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if (AException.ClassName = 'EIdSocketError')
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or (AException.ClassName = 'EIdConnClosedGracefully') then
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Exit;
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Log('Server exception: ' + AException.ClassName + ' - ' + AException.Message);
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.HandleParseAuthentication(AContext: TIdContext;
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const AAuthType, AAuthData: string;
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var VUsername, VPassword: string; var VHandled: Boolean);
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begin
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// Accept any scheme silently; we read the raw header ourselves.
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VHandled := True;
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end;
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destructor TPMHTTPServer.Destroy;
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begin
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Stop;
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FServer.Free;
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inherited;
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end;
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function TPMHTTPServer.GetActive: Boolean;
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begin
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Result := Assigned(FServer) and FServer.Active;
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.Log(const AMsg: string);
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begin
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if Assigned(FOnLog) then FOnLog(AMsg);
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.Start(APort: Integer);
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var
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LBinding: TIdSocketHandle;
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LDBPath, LWebRoot: string;
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begin
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if FServer.Active then Exit;
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// Resolve vault.db AND the web root (parent of the exe = Z:\password-manager\)
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LDBPath := TPath.GetFullPath(TPath.Combine(ExtractFilePath(ParamStr(0)), '..\vault.db'));
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LWebRoot := TPath.GetFullPath(TPath.Combine(ExtractFilePath(ParamStr(0)), '..\'));
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Log('Opening database: ' + LDBPath);
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InitDatabase(LDBPath);
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Log('Database ready.');
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Log('Web root: ' + LWebRoot);
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InitStaticServer(LWebRoot);
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FServer.Bindings.Clear;
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LBinding := FServer.Bindings.Add;
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LBinding.IP := '127.0.0.1';
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LBinding.Port := APort;
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FServer.Active := True;
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Log('Server started on http://127.0.0.1:' + IntToStr(APort));
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.Stop;
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begin
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if not Assigned(FServer) then Exit;
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if FServer.Active then
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begin
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FServer.Active := False;
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Log('Server stopped.');
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end;
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.ApplySecurityHeaders(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo;
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AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo);
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var
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LOrigin: string;
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begin
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Strict-Transport-Security'] :=
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'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains';
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// Content-Security-Policy — tightened May 2026:
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// - script-src: removed 'unsafe-inline'. No <script> tags inline in the
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// served HTML — only external js/app.js. Real XSS defense.
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// - style-src: KEPT 'unsafe-inline' because index.html has inline
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// style="" attributes and app.js sets element.style.cssText
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// extensively. Refactoring that to use CSS classes would be a
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// separate cleanup pass. Style injection alone cannot execute code,
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// so the risk is bounded to visual manipulation / data exfil via
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// CSS selectors (low impact in a single-user loopback app).
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// - connect-src: 'self' + api.pwnedpasswords.com to allow the HIBP
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// range API. Only the SHA-1[0..5] prefix ever leaves the machine.
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Content-Security-Policy'] :=
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'default-src ''self''; ' +
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'script-src ''self''; ' +
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'style-src ''self'' ''unsafe-inline''; ' +
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'connect-src ''self'' https://api.pwnedpasswords.com; ' +
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'img-src ''self'' data:; font-src ''self''; form-action ''self''; ' +
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'frame-ancestors ''none''; base-uri ''self''; object-src ''none''';
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['X-Content-Type-Options'] := 'nosniff';
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Referrer-Policy'] := 'no-referrer';
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// CORS — accept only localhost / 127.0.0.1 origins (any port)
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LOrigin := ARequest.RawHeaders.Values['Origin'];
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if (LOrigin <> '') and (
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(Pos('http://localhost', LOrigin) = 1) or
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(Pos('http://127.0.0.1', LOrigin) = 1) or
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(Pos('https://localhost', LOrigin) = 1) or
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(Pos('https://127.0.0.1', LOrigin) = 1)
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) then
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begin
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Access-Control-Allow-Origin'] := LOrigin;
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Access-Control-Allow-Methods'] :=
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'GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS';
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AResponse.CustomHeaders.Values['Access-Control-Allow-Headers'] :=
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'Content-Type, Authorization, X-CSRF-Token';
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end;
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.HandleCommand(AContext: TIdContext;
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ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo; AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo);
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begin
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ApplySecurityHeaders(ARequest, AResponse);
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try
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// Order: API route → embedded resource (production) → disk static (dev) → 404
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if Router.DispatchRequest(ARequest, AResponse) then Exit;
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if TryServeEmbedded(ARequest, AResponse) then Exit;
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if Assigned(StaticServer) and StaticServer.TryServe(ARequest, AResponse) then Exit;
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TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 404, 'Not found');
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except
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on E: Exception do
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begin
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Log('ERROR ' + ARequest.Command + ' ' + ARequest.Document + ' : ' + E.Message);
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TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 500, 'Internal server error');
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end;
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end;
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end;
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procedure TPMHTTPServer.HandleCommandOther(AContext: TIdContext;
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ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo; AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo);
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begin
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ApplySecurityHeaders(ARequest, AResponse);
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// OPTIONS preflight
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if SameText(ARequest.Command, 'OPTIONS') then
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begin
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AResponse.ResponseNo := 204;
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AResponse.ContentText := '';
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Exit;
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end;
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// Routes for PUT / DELETE go through here in Indy
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try
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if not Router.DispatchRequest(ARequest, AResponse) then
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TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 404, 'Not found');
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except
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on E: Exception do
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begin
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Log('ERROR ' + ARequest.Command + ' ' + ARequest.Document + ' : ' + E.Message);
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TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 500, 'Internal server error');
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end;
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end;
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end;
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end.
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