r-zakarya
02d89c58d2
PBKDF2 is implemented in Pascal rather than through javax.crypto SecretKeyFactory: PBEKeySpec takes a char[] and the provider decides how those chars become bytes, so a non-ASCII sync password would derive a different key than the browser and fail as 'wrong password'. AES-GCM does go through JNI - one call, hardware-backed, and WebCrypto's tag-appended layout is exactly what Cipher expects. The vector is generated with WebCrypto itself and uses a non-ASCII password on purpose; an ASCII-only vector would have hidden that bug. It records the derived key separately from the plaintext so a failure points at one stage instead of the whole chain.
74 lines
2.6 KiB
JavaScript
74 lines
2.6 KiB
JavaScript
// Produces a pm-encrypted-export-v1 container with WebCrypto — the exact
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// primitive the browser uses — so the Delphi/Android implementation can be
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// checked against a known answer instead of "it seems to work on my file".
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//
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// node make-testvector.js > testvector.json
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//
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// The password and the payload are fixed below; keep them in sync with
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// testvector.md. Salt and IV are fixed too, so the output is reproducible and
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// a diff means a real behavioural change.
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const { webcrypto } = require('node:crypto');
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const { subtle } = webcrypto;
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const PASSWORD = 'sync-test-password-éàü'; // deliberately NON-ASCII: that is
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// where char[] vs UTF-8 diverges
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const PAYLOAD = {
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version: 1,
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exported_at: '2026-08-14T12:00:00.000Z',
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username: 'testvector',
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folders: [{ name: 'Work', color: '#3b82f6', icon: '' }],
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entries: [
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{
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uuid: '11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555',
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site: 'example.com',
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title: 'Example',
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username: 'alice',
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password: 'correct horse battery staple',
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folder: 'Work',
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tags: ['demo'],
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kind: 'login',
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deleted: 0,
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},
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{
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uuid: '66666666-7777-8888-9999-000000000000',
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site: 'trashed.example',
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title: 'Trashed',
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username: 'bob',
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password: 'in the bin',
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folder: 'All',
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tags: [],
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kind: 'login',
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deleted: 1,
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deleted_at: '2026-08-01 09:30:00',
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},
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],
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};
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// Fixed, so the file is byte-stable across runs. NEVER do this in the app:
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// a reused salt/IV pair with the same key destroys GCM's security.
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const salt = Buffer.alloc(32);
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for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) salt[i] = i;
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const iv = Buffer.alloc(12);
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for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) iv[i] = 200 + i;
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(async () => {
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const base = await subtle.importKey('raw', new TextEncoder().encode(PASSWORD),
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'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey']);
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const key = await subtle.deriveKey(
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{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt, iterations: 600000, hash: 'SHA-256' },
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base, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 }, false, ['encrypt']);
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const ct = await subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, key,
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new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(PAYLOAD)));
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console.log(JSON.stringify({
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format: 'pm-encrypted-export-v1',
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kdf: 'pbkdf2-sha256',
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kdf_iterations: 600000,
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kdf_salt: salt.toString('base64'),
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iv: iv.toString('base64'),
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ciphertext: Buffer.from(ct).toString('base64'),
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created_at: '2026-08-14T12:00:00.000Z',
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}, null, 2));
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})();
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