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feat(crypto): PBKDF2 iterations 100k → 600k with transparent re-encryption

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Bumps the PBKDF2-SHA256 iteration count from 100,000 (OWASP 2017) to
600,000 (OWASP 2023). 6x slowdown on every brute-force attempt against
either the server-stored auth hash OR the AES-GCM ciphertext of the
entries — both currently use the same PBKDF2 output (see KNOWN ISSUE
below for why that's another problem to fix later).

Schema
======
users.kdf_iterations INTEGER DEFAULT 100000
  Per-user iteration count. Legacy rows predating the column default
  to 100k via the DEFAULT clause. New accounts insert 600k explicitly.

Migration flow
==============
Atomic from the user's perspective. No partial state ever persisted.

  1. /login (or /reauth):
     server reads users.kdf_iterations and verifies the master pw at
     that count. Login succeeds at the legacy strength. Response now
     includes kdfIterations (current) and optionally kdfMigration =
     { target: 600000 } when an upgrade is recommended.

  2. Client:
     derives the AES key at the OLD count to decrypt current entries
     (state.cryptoKey). enterApp() loads the vault normally.

  3. runKdfMigration() (background, after enterApp):
     - derives the NEW key at target iterations
     - decrypts every entry with the old key
     - re-encrypts every entry with the new key + fresh random IVs
     - POSTs { masterPassword, entries: [...] } to /migrate-kdf

  4. /migrate-kdf (new endpoint):
     - verifies the master pw against the OLD hash
     - in a single transaction:
        UPDATE users  SET password_hash = pbkdf2(pw, salt, 600k),
                          kdf_iterations = 600000
        UPDATE vault_entries SET encrypted_password, iv (per entry)
     - on any failure: ROLLBACK. User stays at legacy config, retries
       at next login. No half-migrated state possible.

  5. Client (post-commit):
     swaps state.cryptoKey to the new key, persists it, updates the
     cached ciphertext in state.entries, shows a "Vault security
     upgraded" toast.

Idempotency: server's /migrate-kdf short-circuits with "Already at
target" if users.kdf_iterations >= PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET.

Race conditions: two concurrent migrations from two tabs both
recompute the SAME new key (deterministic PBKDF2). The losing
transaction's entries get re-encrypted with the winning one's IVs,
but both clients can decrypt because the keys are identical.

KNOWN ISSUE (not fixed by this commit)
======================================
The server's password_hash IS the client's AES key, in hex form —
both sides compute PBKDF2(pw, salt, iters) and store/use the same
32 bytes. This means a stolen vault.db gives the attacker the
encryption key directly, without needing to brute-force anything.
The 100k → 600k bump still helps because the AES-GCM ciphertext
itself is also a brute-force target, but the architectural fix
(server stores SHA256(aes_key) instead of aes_key in hex) is a
separate concern that needs its own migration.

Other changes
=============
 - HandleRegister: new accounts insert kdf_iterations=600000.
 - HandleReauth: response upgraded to JSON with kdfIterations
   + optional kdfMigration. Unlock path now also triggers migration.
 - SendAuthSuccess: extended signature, all callers updated.
 - deriveKey(pwd, saltHex, iterations) in app.js: iterations param
   required, defaults to 100000 for back-compat with any legacy caller.
This commit is contained in:
Zaki
2026-05-23 04:54:05 +01:00
parent bff9bdf9f2
commit e0e452306e
3 changed files with 345 additions and 24 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
delphi-backend/Handlers/PM.Handler.Auth.pas
+225 -14
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,15 @@ uses
PM.Session, PM.RateLimit, PM.Audit;
const
// Legacy iteration count from the initial 2025 release. Kept around to
// verify pre-migration login attempts (each user row records its own
// value in users.kdf_iterations). New code paths should reference
// PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET instead.
PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 100000;
// Current target. New accounts hash at this strength; legacy accounts
// are transparently upgraded at next login (see HandleLogin/HandleReauth).
// Value picked per OWASP 2023 PBKDF2-SHA256 recommendation.
PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET = 600000;
DEFAULT_FOLDERS: array[0..4] of string = ('All', 'Social', 'Banking', 'Work', 'Personal');
procedure EnsureDefaultFolders(AUserId: Integer);
@@ -56,9 +64,10 @@ begin
end;
procedure SendAuthSuccess(AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo;
AUserId: Integer; const AToken, ASalt, ACSRFToken: string);
AUserId: Integer; const AToken, ASalt, ACSRFToken: string;
AKdfIterations: Integer; ANeedsMigration: Boolean);
var
LObj: TJSONObject;
LObj, LMig: TJSONObject;
begin
LObj := TJSONObject.Create;
LObj.AddPair('message', 'OK');
@@ -66,6 +75,17 @@ begin
LObj.AddPair('userId', TJSONNumber.Create(AUserId));
LObj.AddPair('salt', ASalt);
LObj.AddPair('csrfToken', ACSRFToken);
// kdfIterations is the iteration count the client must use when deriving
// the AES-GCM key for THIS session — matches the count under which the
// existing entries are encrypted. If the server signals migration, the
// client should re-encrypt with the new target and call /migrate-kdf.
LObj.AddPair('kdfIterations', TJSONNumber.Create(AKdfIterations));
if ANeedsMigration then
begin
LMig := TJSONObject.Create;
LMig.AddPair('target', TJSONNumber.Create(PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET));
LObj.AddPair('kdfMigration', LMig);
end;
TJSONHelper.SendJSON(AResponse, LObj);
end;
@@ -118,17 +138,20 @@ begin
end;
LSalt := RandomHex(32);
LHash := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
// New accounts use the current target iteration count — no migration
// path needed since this is a brand-new vault with zero entries.
LHash := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET);
LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
try
LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
LQ.SQL.Text :=
'INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, salt, hash_algo) ' +
'VALUES (:u, :h, :s, ''pbkdf2'')';
'INSERT INTO users (username, password_hash, salt, hash_algo, kdf_iterations) ' +
'VALUES (:u, :h, :s, ''pbkdf2'', :it)';
LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := LUser;
LQ.ParamByName('h').AsString := LHash;
LQ.ParamByName('s').AsString := LSalt;
LQ.ParamByName('it').AsInteger := PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET;
LQ.ExecSQL;
LUserId := DB.Connection.GetLastAutoGenValue('users');
finally
@@ -141,7 +164,9 @@ begin
EnsureDefaultFolders(LUserId);
CreateSession(LUserId, LToken, LCSRF);
LogAudit(LUserId, 'register', LIP);
SendAuthSuccess(AResponse, LUserId, LToken, LSalt, LCSRF);
// No migration ever needed for fresh accounts.
SendAuthSuccess(AResponse, LUserId, LToken, LSalt, LCSRF,
PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET, False);
end;
// ===== /login ================================================================
@@ -151,7 +176,7 @@ procedure HandleLogin(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo;
var
LBody: TJSONObject;
LUser, LPwd, LSalt, LStoredHash, LAlgo, LToken, LCSRF, LIP: string;
LUserId: Integer;
LUserId, LKdfIters: Integer;
LQ: TFDQuery;
LComputed: string;
LValid: Boolean;
@@ -182,7 +207,8 @@ begin
try
LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
LQ.SQL.Text :=
'SELECT id, password_hash, salt, hash_algo FROM users WHERE username = :u';
'SELECT id, password_hash, salt, hash_algo, kdf_iterations ' +
'FROM users WHERE username = :u';
LQ.ParamByName('u').AsString := LUser;
LQ.Open;
if LQ.IsEmpty then
@@ -201,7 +227,11 @@ begin
LStoredHash := LQ.FieldByName('password_hash').AsString;
LSalt := LQ.FieldByName('salt').AsString;
LAlgo := LQ.FieldByName('hash_algo').AsString;
LKdfIters := LQ.FieldByName('kdf_iterations').AsInteger;
if LAlgo = '' then LAlgo := 'pbkdf2';
// Legacy rows predating the kdf_iterations column have NULL → 0 here;
// treat as the original 100k value used by api.php and early Delphi.
if LKdfIters <= 0 then LKdfIters := PBKDF2_ITERATIONS;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
@@ -212,7 +242,10 @@ begin
LValid := False;
if SameText(LAlgo, 'pbkdf2') then
begin
LComputed := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
// Verify with the user's own iteration count (NOT the global constant).
// Legacy users at 100k still need to log in successfully so the client
// can decrypt their entries before triggering the /migrate-kdf flow.
LComputed := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, LKdfIters);
LValid := ConstantTimeEquals(LComputed, LStoredHash);
end
else if SameText(LAlgo, 'bcrypt') then
@@ -242,7 +275,11 @@ begin
EnsureDefaultFolders(LUserId);
CreateSession(LUserId, LToken, LCSRF);
LogAudit(LUserId, 'login', LIP);
SendAuthSuccess(AResponse, LUserId, LToken, LSalt, LCSRF);
// Signal migration when the user's current iteration count is below the
// target. The client will re-encrypt all entries and call /migrate-kdf
// to commit everything atomically.
SendAuthSuccess(AResponse, LUserId, LToken, LSalt, LCSRF,
LKdfIters, LKdfIters < PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET);
end;
// ===== /logout ===============================================================
@@ -276,7 +313,7 @@ end;
procedure HandleReauth(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo;
AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo; const AParams: TArray<string>);
var
LUserId: Integer;
LUserId, LKdfIters: Integer;
LBody: TJSONObject;
LUser, LPwd, LStoredHash, LSalt, LAlgo, LIP, LComputed: string;
LQ: TFDQuery;
@@ -310,7 +347,8 @@ begin
LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
// Pull username too — needed for the per-account lockout calls.
LQ.SQL.Text :=
'SELECT username, password_hash, salt, hash_algo FROM users WHERE id = :uid';
'SELECT username, password_hash, salt, hash_algo, kdf_iterations ' +
'FROM users WHERE id = :uid';
LQ.ParamByName('uid').AsInteger := LUserId;
LQ.Open;
if LQ.IsEmpty then
@@ -323,7 +361,9 @@ begin
LStoredHash := LQ.FieldByName('password_hash').AsString;
LSalt := LQ.FieldByName('salt').AsString;
LAlgo := LQ.FieldByName('hash_algo').AsString;
LKdfIters := LQ.FieldByName('kdf_iterations').AsInteger;
if LAlgo = '' then LAlgo := 'pbkdf2';
if LKdfIters <= 0 then LKdfIters := PBKDF2_ITERATIONS;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
@@ -340,7 +380,8 @@ begin
LValid := False;
if SameText(LAlgo, 'pbkdf2') then
begin
LComputed := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, PBKDF2_ITERATIONS);
// Verify with the user's stored iteration count, same as HandleLogin.
LComputed := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, LKdfIters);
LValid := ConstantTimeEquals(LComputed, LStoredHash);
end;
@@ -356,7 +397,176 @@ begin
ClearAttempts(LIP);
ClearAccountLockout(LUser);
LogAudit(LUserId, 'reauth', LIP);
TJSONHelper.SendOK(AResponse, 'OK');
// Return KDF state so the client can detect legacy accounts that haven't
// been migrated yet — unlock from a locked state goes through reauth, not
// login, so we need the same migration signaling here.
begin
var LObj := TJSONObject.Create;
LObj.AddPair('message', 'OK');
LObj.AddPair('kdfIterations', TJSONNumber.Create(LKdfIters));
if LKdfIters < PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET then
begin
var LMig := TJSONObject.Create;
LMig.AddPair('target', TJSONNumber.Create(PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET));
LObj.AddPair('kdfMigration', LMig);
end;
TJSONHelper.SendJSON(AResponse, LObj);
end;
end;
// ===== /migrate-kdf ==========================================================
// Atomic transition from an old PBKDF2 iteration count to the current target.
// Client side: derive both old and new AES keys, decrypt each entry with old,
// re-encrypt with new, then POST the new ciphertext blob to this endpoint
// along with the master password (so we can recompute the new server hash).
// Server side: verify the master pw with the old hash, then in a single
// transaction: update users.password_hash to the new PBKDF2 output, set
// kdf_iterations to TARGET, and replace each entry's encrypted_password/iv.
// All-or-nothing: if anything fails, the user stays on the old config.
procedure HandleMigrateKdf(ARequest: TIdHTTPRequestInfo;
AResponse: TIdHTTPResponseInfo; const AParams: TArray<string>);
var
LUserId, LOldIters, I: Integer;
LBody, LEntry: TJSONObject;
LEntries: TJSONArray;
LUser, LPwd, LSalt, LStoredHash, LAlgo, LIP, LComputed, LNewHash: string;
LQ: TFDQuery;
LValid: Boolean;
LEntryId: Integer;
LEncPwd, LIv: string;
begin
try
LUserId := Authenticate(ARequest, AResponse);
RequireCSRF(ARequest, AResponse, LUserId);
except
on ESessionRejected do Exit;
end;
LIP := GetClientIP(ARequest);
LBody := TJSONHelper.ReadBody(ARequest);
try
LPwd := LBody.GetValue<string>('masterPassword', '');
LEntries := LBody.GetValue<TJSONArray>('entries');
if LEntries = nil then
begin
TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 400, 'Missing entries array');
Exit;
end;
DB.Lock;
try
// Step 1: load current user state.
LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
try
LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
LQ.SQL.Text :=
'SELECT username, password_hash, salt, hash_algo, kdf_iterations ' +
'FROM users WHERE id = :uid';
LQ.ParamByName('uid').AsInteger := LUserId;
LQ.Open;
if LQ.IsEmpty then
begin
TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 401, 'User not found');
Exit;
end;
LUser := LQ.FieldByName('username').AsString;
LStoredHash := LQ.FieldByName('password_hash').AsString;
LSalt := LQ.FieldByName('salt').AsString;
LAlgo := LQ.FieldByName('hash_algo').AsString;
LOldIters := LQ.FieldByName('kdf_iterations').AsInteger;
if LAlgo = '' then LAlgo := 'pbkdf2';
if LOldIters <= 0 then LOldIters := PBKDF2_ITERATIONS;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
// Idempotency: if already at target, nothing to do.
if LOldIters >= PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET then
begin
TJSONHelper.SendOK(AResponse, 'Already at target');
Exit;
end;
// Step 2: verify the master pw against the CURRENT (old) hash.
LValid := False;
if SameText(LAlgo, 'pbkdf2') then
begin
LComputed := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, LOldIters);
LValid := ConstantTimeEquals(LComputed, LStoredHash);
end;
if not LValid then
begin
RecordFailedAccountAttempt(LUser, LIP);
LogAudit(LUserId, 'failed_migrate_kdf', LIP);
TJSONHelper.SendError(AResponse, 401, 'Invalid password');
Exit;
end;
// Step 3: compute the new password hash with target iterations.
LNewHash := PBKDF2_SHA256_Hex(LPwd, LSalt, PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET);
// Step 4: atomic transaction — update user hash AND every entry's
// ciphertext together. Any failure rolls back, leaving the user on
// the legacy config (safe to retry next login).
DB.Connection.StartTransaction;
try
LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
try
LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
LQ.SQL.Text :=
'UPDATE users SET password_hash = :h, kdf_iterations = :it ' +
'WHERE id = :uid';
LQ.ParamByName('h').AsString := LNewHash;
LQ.ParamByName('it').AsInteger := PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET;
LQ.ParamByName('uid').AsInteger := LUserId;
LQ.ExecSQL;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
LQ := TFDQuery.Create(nil);
try
LQ.Connection := DB.Connection;
LQ.SQL.Text :=
'UPDATE vault_entries ' +
'SET encrypted_password = :ep, iv = :iv, updated_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP ' +
'WHERE id = :id AND user_id = :uid';
for I := 0 to LEntries.Count - 1 do
begin
LEntry := LEntries.Items[I] as TJSONObject;
LEntryId := LEntry.GetValue<Integer>('id', 0);
LEncPwd := LEntry.GetValue<string>('encrypted_password', '');
LIv := LEntry.GetValue<string>('iv', '');
if (LEntryId <= 0) or (LEncPwd = '') or (LIv = '') then
raise Exception.CreateFmt('Invalid entry payload at index %d', [I]);
LQ.ParamByName('id').AsInteger := LEntryId;
LQ.ParamByName('uid').AsInteger := LUserId;
LQ.ParamByName('ep').AsString := LEncPwd;
LQ.ParamByName('iv').AsString := LIv;
LQ.ExecSQL;
end;
finally
LQ.Free;
end;
DB.Connection.Commit;
except
DB.Connection.Rollback;
raise;
end;
finally
DB.Unlock;
end;
finally
LBody.Free;
end;
LogAudit(LUserId, Format('migrate_kdf %d->%d', [LOldIters, PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET]), LIP);
TJSONHelper.SendOK(AResponse, 'Migration complete');
end;
initialization
@@ -364,5 +574,6 @@ initialization
Router.Register('POST', '/login', HandleLogin);
Router.Register('POST', '/logout', HandleLogout);
Router.Register('POST', '/reauth', HandleReauth);
Router.Register('POST', '/migrate-kdf', HandleMigrateKdf);
end.
delphi-backend/Source/PM.Database.pas
+6
View File
@@ -216,6 +216,12 @@ begin
// Simple format, search via LIKE %tag%. Frontend handles parsing/joining.
AddColumnIfMissing('vault_entries', 'tags', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''''');
AddColumnIfMissing('users', 'hash_algo', 'TEXT DEFAULT ''pbkdf2''');
// PBKDF2 iteration count per user. Legacy rows (predating this column)
// default to 100000 — the value used by api.php / the early Delphi build.
// New accounts created here use the current PBKDF2_ITERATIONS_TARGET
// (600 000 as of 2026). Login flow transparently re-hashes legacy users
// and re-encrypts their entries on the client side.
AddColumnIfMissing('users', 'kdf_iterations', 'INTEGER DEFAULT 100000');
AddColumnIfMissing('sessions', 'csrf_token', 'TEXT');
end;
js/app.js
+110 -6
View File
@@ -88,13 +88,18 @@ const state = {
// CRYPTO (preserved from legacy app.js — DO NOT TOUCH)
// ============================================================
async function deriveKey(pwd, saltHex) {
async function deriveKey(pwd, saltHex, iterations) {
// Iterations parameter is the per-user value returned by the server in
// the /login response (legacy users = 100000, modern = 600000). Falling
// back to 100000 keeps backwards compatibility with old code paths that
// didn't pass the value, but every new caller should pass it explicitly.
iterations = iterations || 100000;
const enc = new TextEncoder();
const km = await crypto.subtle.importKey('raw', enc.encode(pwd), 'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey']);
// saltHex is the same string that PHP/Delphi passed to PBKDF2 — use its bytes.
const sb = enc.encode(saltHex);
return crypto.subtle.deriveKey(
{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt: sb, iterations: 100000, hash: 'SHA-256' },
{ name: 'PBKDF2', salt: sb, iterations: iterations, hash: 'SHA-256' },
km,
{ name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 },
true, ['encrypt', 'decrypt']
@@ -169,6 +174,92 @@ async function api(path, opts) {
return body;
}
// ============================================================
// KDF MIGRATION (PBKDF2 100k → 600k re-encryption)
// ============================================================
//
// When the server signals kdfMigration in /login or /reauth, we transparently
// re-encrypt every entry with a stronger key (600k PBKDF2 iterations) and
// commit the new ciphertext + the new server-side hash in one atomic
// /migrate-kdf request. If anything fails, the user stays on the legacy
// config and the migration retries at next login. The entries currently
// loaded in state.entries are encrypted with the OLD key (state.cryptoKey).
//
// Threading: runs in the background after enterApp completes. Locking the
// vault during migration is safe — we just lose the in-flight transition
// and the server's atomic rollback means nothing persisted.
let kdfMigrationInProgress = false;
async function runKdfMigration(masterPwd, fromIters, toIters) {
if (kdfMigrationInProgress) return; // dedupe concurrent calls
if (!state.entries || !state.cryptoKey) return;
kdfMigrationInProgress = true;
try {
// Derive the new key. The old key is already in state.cryptoKey
// (used to decrypt the entries we just loaded).
const newKey = await deriveKey(masterPwd, state.salt, toIters);
// Re-encrypt every entry. Each entry gets a fresh random IV under
// the new key — never reuse the old IV with the new key (would be
// pointless but also a small information leak via IV reuse patterns).
const newCiphertexts = [];
for (const entry of state.entries) {
const plain = await decryptPwd(entry.encrypted_password, entry.iv);
if (plain === '[ERROR]') {
// One decrypt failure aborts the whole migration — better to
// stay on the legacy config than to commit partial state.
throw new Error('Could not decrypt entry id=' + entry.id);
}
const tmpKey = state.cryptoKey;
try {
state.cryptoKey = newKey;
const re = await encryptPwd(plain);
newCiphertexts.push({
id: entry.id,
encrypted_password: re.encrypted,
iv: re.iv,
});
} finally {
state.cryptoKey = tmpKey; // restore for any concurrent read
}
}
// Send the atomic migrate request. Server verifies the master pw
// against the OLD hash, then updates hash + iterations + every
// entry in a single transaction.
await api('/migrate-kdf', {
method: 'POST',
headers: authHeaders({ 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }),
body: JSON.stringify({
masterPassword: masterPwd,
entries: newCiphertexts,
}),
});
// Server committed → switch our in-memory crypto key and update
// the cached ciphertexts in state.entries so subsequent reads use
// the new key transparently.
state.cryptoKey = newKey;
await persistCryptoKey();
for (let i = 0; i < state.entries.length; i++) {
const nc = newCiphertexts[i];
state.entries[i].encrypted_password = nc.encrypted_password;
state.entries[i].iv = nc.iv;
}
toast('Vault security upgraded (' + fromIters.toLocaleString() +
' → ' + toIters.toLocaleString() + ' KDF iterations)');
} catch (err) {
// Silent retry on next login — the migration is idempotent and
// safe to abandon (server rolled back).
console.warn('KDF migration aborted:', err);
} finally {
kdfMigrationInProgress = false;
}
}
// ============================================================
// ACCOUNT LOCKOUT UI
// ============================================================
@@ -277,10 +368,17 @@ async function doLogin(e) {
sessionStorage.setItem('csrfToken', state.csrf);
sessionStorage.setItem('salt', state.salt);
sessionStorage.setItem('username', state.username);
state.cryptoKey = await deriveKey(p, state.salt);
// Derive with the server-specified iteration count — legacy users
// receive 100k, modern users 600k. The cryptoKey is what currently
// decrypts the entries on this server.
state.cryptoKey = await deriveKey(p, state.salt, r.kdfIterations);
await persistCryptoKey();
toast('Welcome back, ' + u);
await enterApp();
// Trigger KDF migration AFTER entries are loaded into state.
if (r.kdfMigration && r.kdfMigration.target) {
runKdfMigration(p, r.kdfIterations, r.kdfMigration.target);
}
} catch (err) {
// 429 with retry_after = account lockout. Show countdown in the
// auth hint instead of a generic error toast, and keep the login
@@ -317,7 +415,9 @@ async function doRegister(e) {
sessionStorage.setItem('csrfToken', state.csrf);
sessionStorage.setItem('salt', state.salt);
sessionStorage.setItem('username', state.username);
state.cryptoKey = await deriveKey(p, state.salt);
// Fresh account → server returns kdfIterations = current target.
// No migration ever needed for a brand-new vault.
state.cryptoKey = await deriveKey(p, state.salt, r.kdfIterations);
await persistCryptoKey();
toast('Vault created');
await enterApp();
@@ -375,18 +475,22 @@ function lockVault() {
// then re-derive the crypto key locally without rotating session/csrf.
async function doUnlock(p) {
try {
await api('/reauth', {
const r = await api('/reauth', {
method: 'POST',
headers: authHeaders({ 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }),
body: JSON.stringify({ masterPassword: p }),
});
state.cryptoKey = await deriveKey(p, state.salt);
// r now carries kdfIterations + optional kdfMigration, same as /login.
state.cryptoKey = await deriveKey(p, state.salt, r.kdfIterations);
await persistCryptoKey();
state.locked = false;
$('#loginUsername').readOnly = false;
$('#authHint').textContent = '';
toast('Unlocked');
await enterApp();
if (r.kdfMigration && r.kdfMigration.target) {
runKdfMigration(p, r.kdfIterations, r.kdfMigration.target);
}
return true;
} catch (err) {
// Account lockout (too many wrong master pw attempts): show