diff --git a/CLAUDE.md b/CLAUDE.md
index 39a6e72..8ce8bd7 100644
--- a/CLAUDE.md
+++ b/CLAUDE.md
@@ -581,9 +581,15 @@ bypasses the PIN check (the device is already trusted).
 Sensitive actions (`askReauth` paths: export, change master pw,
 recovery code, etc.) ALWAYS require master pw — PIN never substitutes.
 
-Master pw rotation clears the PIN blob (same reason as Quick Unlock :
-stored wrapped key + server verifier drift). User re-sets PIN from
-Settings after rotation.
+Master pw rotation **clears the PIN blob** (stored wrapped key + server
+verifier drift). Unlike Quick Unlock — which stores the raw key directly
+(DPAPI-wrapped, no user secret) and is therefore **re-wrapped in place**
+with the new key/salt/iters/algo during rotation so it survives — the PIN
+blob is wrapped by `PBKDF2(pin)` and can't be re-wrapped without the PIN,
+so it's wiped and the user re-sets it from Settings. `doChangeMasterPassword`
+does the two via `window.location.href` (quickunlock/store then pin/clear)
+with a `setTimeout(0)` between them so the back-to-back navigations don't
+coalesce and drop the re-wrap.
 
 ## Quick Unlock
 
diff --git a/delphi-backend/assets/assets.res b/delphi-backend/assets/assets.res
index 3735e69..29dac9d 100644
Binary files a/delphi-backend/assets/assets.res and b/delphi-backend/assets/assets.res differ
diff --git a/js/app.js b/js/app.js
index 8a7948f..2af0897 100644
--- a/js/app.js
+++ b/js/app.js
@@ -7968,6 +7968,11 @@ async function doChangeMasterPassword() {
     // re-encryption passes in parallel.
     const btn = $('#cmConfirmBtn');
     if (btn) btn.disabled = true;
+    // Rotation re-encrypts every entry (and every attachment) under the new
+    // key — seconds to tens of seconds on a big vault. Show a spinner so it
+    // doesn't look frozen; 0ms yield lets it paint before the loop blocks.
+    showBusy('Re-encrypting vault…');
+    await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 0));
     try {
         // Step 1: generate the new salt and derive the new AES key + verifier.
         // Also compute the verifier for the CURRENT pw so the server can
@@ -7997,7 +8002,12 @@ async function doChangeMasterPassword() {
         // round-trip can still reach the OLD key.
         const oldKey = state.cryptoKey;
         const encrypted = [];
+        let _cmDone = 0;
+        const _cmTotal = state.entries.length;
         for (const e of state.entries) {
+            _cmDone++;
+            if (_cmTotal > 10 && (_cmDone % 5 === 0 || _cmDone === _cmTotal))
+                updateBusy('Re-encrypting entries… ' + _cmDone + '/' + _cmTotal);
             const plain = await decryptPwd(e.encrypted_password, e.iv);
             if (plain === '[ERROR]') {
                 throw new Error('Could not decrypt entry id=' + e.id);
@@ -8090,9 +8100,12 @@ async function doChangeMasterPassword() {
         try {
             const allAttach = await api('/attachments/all', { headers: authHeaders() });
             if (allAttach && allAttach.length > 0) {
-                toast('Re-encrypting ' + allAttach.length + ' attachment(s)…');
                 let failed = 0;
+                let _atDone = 0;
+                const _atTotal = allAttach.length;
                 for (const meta of allAttach) {
+                    _atDone++;
+                    updateBusy('Re-encrypting attachments… ' + _atDone + '/' + _atTotal);
                     try {
                         // state.cryptoKey is already newKey at this point.
                         // Swap to oldKey for decryption, then back for upload.
@@ -8133,14 +8146,40 @@ async function doChangeMasterPassword() {
             state.entries[i].totp_iv            = nc.totp_iv     || null;
         }
 
-        // The DPAPI quick-unlock blob (if any) still holds the OLD AES key
-        // bundle, which would unlock to entries encrypted with the new key
-        // → unreadable. Clear it; user can re-enable from Settings.
+        // Quick-unlock blob holds the raw AES key bundle. It stores the key
+        // directly (DPAPI-wrapped, no user secret), so instead of forcing
+        // the user to re-enable it after every rotation we transparently
+        // RE-WRAP it with the new key + salt + iters + algo. state.* already
+        // reflects the new values at this point (step 4 above). Cold-start
+        // then re-logs in with a verifier derived from the new key.
         if (Bridge.active && localStorage.getItem('quickUnlockEnabled') === '1') {
-            window.location.href = 'cmd://quickunlock/clear';
-            localStorage.removeItem('quickUnlockEnabled');
-            state.quickUnlockEnabled = false;
+            try {
+                const raw = await crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', state.cryptoKey);
+                const blob = JSON.stringify({
+                    v:              2,
+                    username:       state.username,
+                    salt:           state.salt,
+                    kdfIterations:  state.kdfIterations,
+                    hashAlgo:       state.hashAlgo || '',
+                    key:            bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(raw)),
+                });
+                const b64 = bytesToBase64(new TextEncoder().encode(blob));
+                window.location.href = 'cmd://quickunlock/store?data=' +
+                    encodeURIComponent(b64);
+                // stays enabled — flag + state unchanged
+            } catch (_) {
+                // Re-wrap failed → fall back to clearing so we never leave a
+                // stale (old-key) blob that would decrypt to garbage.
+                window.location.href = 'cmd://quickunlock/clear';
+                localStorage.removeItem('quickUnlockEnabled');
+                state.quickUnlockEnabled = false;
+            }
         }
+        // Yield so the quick-unlock store navigation above is processed
+        // before the PIN clear below — both go through window.location.href
+        // and back-to-back assignments can coalesce (only the last lands),
+        // which would drop the quick-unlock re-wrap and leave a stale blob.
+        await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 0));
         // Same problem for the PIN blob — wrapped key is from the old
         // master, server verifier won't match anymore. Wipe so the user
         // gets a clean fallback to master pw next time.
@@ -8170,6 +8209,7 @@ async function doChangeMasterPassword() {
             showCmError('Failed: ' + (err.message || 'unknown error'));
         }
     } finally {
+        hideBusy();
         if (btn) btn.disabled = false;
     }
 }