feat(crypto): Argon2id KDF foundation (vendored, not yet adopted)
Phase 1 of CODE_AUDIT §1.2 — additive, no live account uses Argon2id yet. - Vendor @noble/hashes@2.2.0 argon2id as js/argon2.js (esbuild IIFE exposing globalThis.NobleArgon2). Pure-JS, not WASM: CSP is script-src 'self' with no wasm-unsafe-eval, so WASM would require weakening it. Verified against the RFC 9106 §5.3 test vector. Server needs zero Argon2 (zero-knowledge: it only ever SHA256-wraps the client verifier). - app.js: deriveKeyBytes(pwd, salt, algo, iters, argonParams) branches Argon2id vs PBKDF2; deriveKeyAndVerifier refactored around it. New markers HASH_ALGO_ARGON2='argon2id-v2' + ARGON2_DEFAULT_PARAMS (OWASP m=19MiB,t=2,p=1, ~0.65s/unlock). isDecoupledVerifierAlgo() generalises the decoupled-verifier rule to any '-v2' scheme so argon2id-v2 inherits it. AES key is still ALWAYS the raw KDF output → entries decryptable, legacy accounts untouched. - index.html loads js/argon2.js before app.js; added to BuildAssets whitelist; test harness loads it into the sandbox first. - Tests: +5 (RFC 9106 vector via vendored bundle, argon2 branch derives Argon2 key not PBKDF2, decoupled verifier, AES round-trip under Argon2 key). 40/40. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -69,6 +69,67 @@ test('deriveKeyAndVerifier: v2 verifier is decoupled SHA-256(keyHex + domain)',
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assert.notEqual(verifier, keyHex, 'v2 verifier must not leak the AES key');
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});
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// ---- Argon2id KDF (js/argon2.js — vendored @noble/hashes) -------------------
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test('vendored argon2id matches the RFC 9106 §5.3 test vector', () => {
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// Independent cross-check that the bundled library is correct (not just
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// self-consistent). Same vector used to validate the vendored bundle.
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const out = T.NobleArgon2.argon2id(
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new Uint8Array(32).fill(1), new Uint8Array(16).fill(2),
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{ t: 3, m: 32, p: 4, dkLen: 32,
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key: new Uint8Array(8).fill(3),
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personalization: new Uint8Array(12).fill(4), version: 0x13 });
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assert.equal(T.bytesToHex(out),
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'0d640df58d78766c08c037a34a8b53c9d01ef0452d75b65eb52520e96b01e659');
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});
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test('isDecoupledVerifierAlgo: all -v2 markers decouple, legacy does not', () => {
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assert.equal(T.isDecoupledVerifierAlgo(T.HASH_ALGO_V2), true);
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assert.equal(T.isDecoupledVerifierAlgo(T.HASH_ALGO_ARGON2), true);
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assert.equal(T.isDecoupledVerifierAlgo('pbkdf2-sha256'), false);
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assert.equal(T.isDecoupledVerifierAlgo('pbkdf2'), false);
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assert.equal(T.isDecoupledVerifierAlgo(''), false);
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});
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test('deriveKeyAndVerifier: argon2id branch derives an Argon2 key, NOT PBKDF2', async () => {
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const pwd = 'correct horse battery staple';
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const saltHex = 'a1b2c3d4e5f6a1b2';
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// The raw key bytes must equal argon2id(pwd, saltHex-utf8, params) — cross
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// checked against the vendored lib directly (small params for test speed).
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const params = { m: 256, t: 1, p: 1 };
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const expectKey = T.bytesToHex(T.NobleArgon2.argon2id(
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new TextEncoder().encode(pwd), new TextEncoder().encode(saltHex),
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{ t: params.t, m: params.m, p: params.p, dkLen: 32, version: 0x13 }));
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const { cryptoKey, verifier } = await T.deriveKeyAndVerifier(
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pwd, saltHex, 0, T.HASH_ALGO_ARGON2, params);
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const raw = await ctx.crypto.subtle.exportKey('raw', cryptoKey);
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assert.equal(T.bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(raw)), expectKey, 'AES key must be the Argon2id output');
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// Differs from what PBKDF2 would give for the same pw/salt (different KDF).
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assert.notEqual(T.bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(raw)), refKeyHex(pwd, saltHex, 100000));
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// argon2id-v2 is a '-v2' scheme → verifier is decoupled SHA-256, not the key.
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assert.equal(verifier, refSha256Hex(expectKey + T.AUTH_VERIFIER_DOMAIN));
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assert.notEqual(verifier, expectKey, 'argon2id-v2 verifier must not leak the key');
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});
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test('deriveKeyAndVerifier: argon2id uses ARGON2_DEFAULT_PARAMS when none passed', async () => {
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// OWASP baseline is the default (m=19456, t=2, p=1). Just assert the
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// default object is what we expect; deriving at 19 MiB is left to one
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// explicit round-trip below to keep the suite fast.
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assert.deepEqual({ ...T.ARGON2_DEFAULT_PARAMS }, { m: 19456, t: 2, p: 1 });
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});
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test('encrypt/decrypt round-trips under an Argon2id-derived key', async () => {
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const { cryptoKey } = await T.deriveKeyAndVerifier(
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'master', 'saltsaltsalt', 0, T.HASH_ALGO_ARGON2, { m: 512, t: 1, p: 1 });
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T.state.cryptoKey = cryptoKey;
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const { encrypted, iv } = await T.encryptPwd('argon-secret 🔐');
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assert.equal(await T.decryptPwd(encrypted, iv), 'argon-secret 🔐');
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});
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test('verifierFromKeyHex: pure mapping matches deriveKeyAndVerifier', async () => {
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const keyHex = 'ab'.repeat(32);
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assert.equal(await T.verifierFromKeyHex(keyHex, 'anything-legacy'), keyHex);
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