fix(csrf): validate against the presented session, not the most recent (6c-3)
RequireCSRF looked up csrf_token by user_id ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1 — the newest session, not the one whose Bearer token was presented. Two consequences: created_at's 1-second resolution made two same-second sessions a coin-flip (phantom 403s), and conceptually it accepted "any valid CSRF for this user" rather than the one bound to this session. Now queried by token_hash = SHA256(bearer) AND user_id. Authenticate already located this row + checked expiry, so the expiry clause is dropped. Signature unchanged. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -668,6 +668,13 @@ prochain démarrage.
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### 6c-3. 🟡 Le CSRF est validé contre la mauvaise session
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> ✅ **RÉSOLU 2026-07-16.** `RequireCSRF` lit désormais `csrf_token WHERE
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> token_hash = :th AND user_id = :uid` (la session présentée), plus de
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> `ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1`. `ExtractBearerToken`/`SHA256Hex` déjà
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> utilisés par `Authenticate` dans la même unité ; signature inchangée, aucun
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> call-site touché. Le re-test d'expiry est retiré (Authenticate tourne avant
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> et l'a déjà fait, désormais sur la même base UTC après §6c-2).
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[`RequireCSRF`](delphi-backend/Source/PM.Session.pas:120) cherche le
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`csrf_token` par `user_id ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1` — la session la plus
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récente, **pas celle réellement présentée**. Deux conséquences :
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