feat(android): container crypto unit plus a known-answer test vector

PBKDF2 is implemented in Pascal rather than through javax.crypto SecretKeyFactory: PBEKeySpec takes a char[] and the provider decides how those chars become bytes, so a non-ASCII sync password would derive a different key than the browser and fail as 'wrong password'. AES-GCM does go through JNI - one call, hardware-backed, and WebCrypto's tag-appended layout is exactly what Cipher expects. The vector is generated with WebCrypto itself and uses a non-ASCII password on purpose; an ASCII-only vector would have hidden that bug. It records the derived key separately from the plaintext so a failure points at one stage instead of the whole chain.
2026-08-14 18:04:39 +01:00
parent 90ac75525a
commit 02d89c58d2
4 changed files with 419 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+// Produces a pm-encrypted-export-v1 container with WebCrypto — the exact
+// primitive the browser uses — so the Delphi/Android implementation can be
+// checked against a known answer instead of "it seems to work on my file".
+//
+//   node make-testvector.js > testvector.json
+//
+// The password and the payload are fixed below; keep them in sync with
+// testvector.md. Salt and IV are fixed too, so the output is reproducible and
+// a diff means a real behavioural change.
+
+const { webcrypto } = require('node:crypto');
+const { subtle } = webcrypto;
+
+const PASSWORD = 'sync-test-password-éàü';   // deliberately NON-ASCII: that is
+                                             // where char[] vs UTF-8 diverges
+const PAYLOAD = {
+    version: 1,
+    exported_at: '2026-08-14T12:00:00.000Z',
+    username: 'testvector',
+    folders: [{ name: 'Work', color: '#3b82f6', icon: '' }],
+    entries: [
+        {
+            uuid: '11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555',
+            site: 'example.com',
+            title: 'Example',
+            username: 'alice',
+            password: 'correct horse battery staple',
+            folder: 'Work',
+            tags: ['demo'],
+            kind: 'login',
+            deleted: 0,
+        },
+        {
+            uuid: '66666666-7777-8888-9999-000000000000',
+            site: 'trashed.example',
+            title: 'Trashed',
+            username: 'bob',
+            password: 'in the bin',
+            folder: 'All',
+            tags: [],
+            kind: 'login',
+            deleted: 1,
+            deleted_at: '2026-08-01 09:30:00',
+        },
+    ],
+};
+
+// Fixed, so the file is byte-stable across runs. NEVER do this in the app:
+// a reused salt/IV pair with the same key destroys GCM's security.
+const salt = Buffer.alloc(32);
+for (let i = 0; i < 32; i++) salt[i] = i;
+const iv = Buffer.alloc(12);
+for (let i = 0; i < 12; i++) iv[i] = 200 + i;
+
+(async () => {
+    const base = await subtle.importKey('raw', new TextEncoder().encode(PASSWORD),
+        'PBKDF2', false, ['deriveKey']);
+    const key = await subtle.deriveKey(
+        { name: 'PBKDF2', salt, iterations: 600000, hash: 'SHA-256' },
+        base, { name: 'AES-GCM', length: 256 }, false, ['encrypt']);
+    const ct = await subtle.encrypt({ name: 'AES-GCM', iv }, key,
+        new TextEncoder().encode(JSON.stringify(PAYLOAD)));
+
+    console.log(JSON.stringify({
+        format: 'pm-encrypted-export-v1',
+        kdf: 'pbkdf2-sha256',
+        kdf_iterations: 600000,
+        kdf_salt: salt.toString('base64'),
+        iv: iv.toString('base64'),
+        ciphertext: Buffer.from(ct).toString('base64'),
+        created_at: '2026-08-14T12:00:00.000Z',
+    }, null, 2));
+})();